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INTRODUCTION
Recent evidence suggests that we are failing in our mission to
keep children safe from abuse.' To succeed in that mission, we must
understand the nature of the problem. Initially, we must under-
stand that severe child abuse does not always occur suddenly and
without warning. In many instances, in fact, children who die from
abuse have been beaten over a long period time.2 Thus, the abuse is
not simply the product of one isolated event; it represents a pattern
of violence.3 Furthermore, in such situations, often people who know
that children are being beaten do nothing to protect the child from
further abuse.4 Many people, for instance, family members living in
a home where abuse takes place, friends, neighbors, and relatives
outside the home may know about the beatings from first-hand ob-
servations of the abuse or its aftermath. Given the gravity of the
mission, one might expect the law to require some response by these
people. Certainly, their knowledge puts them in the best position to
intervene to stop the violence.5 Yet, when they do not act on what
they know, tort law has traditionally excused their failure, and thus,
become a silent partner in the abuse.6
1. The National Center on Child Abuse Prevention Research found a 40% increase
in child abuse reporting between 1985-91. DEBORAH DARO & KAREN MCCURDY, CURRENT
TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTINGS AND FATALITIES 2 (National Committee for the Pre-
vention of Child Abuse Working Paper No. 808, 1992). The increases were attributed to
economic stress due to poverty, unemployment, and related work concerns; increased
public awareness; improvements in the internal counting systems of state agencies; and
substance abuse. Id. at 5.
2. One author has stated: "This is consistent with modern medical and social science
data recognizing a 'battered child syndrome' as a recurring pattern of child abuse." RUTH
FLEET THURMAN, CLIENT INCEST AND THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 23 (1985)
(citations omitted). See also Susan A. Collier, Note, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral
Obligations Fail, 15 PAC. L.J. 189, 191 (1983) (asserting that "child battering typically es-
calates and more serious injuries are inflicted .....
3. THUI AN, supra note 2, at 15.
4. All states impose mandatory reporting requirements on professionals who have
evidence of child abuse. Those professionals may include medical personnel, school per-
sonnel, law enforcement agencies, mental health personnel, clergy, and daycare workers.
For a comprehensive list of requirements of each state, see LEONARD KARP AND CHERYL
KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS, 269-94 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter KARP]. The issue of profes-
sionals' liability for falling to protect a child from abuse is outside the scope of this article.
5. Twenty states impose a mandatory reporting requirement on all people to report
child abuse. For a complete list, see KARP, supra note 4, at 269-94. These states impose a
reporting requirement, not a duty to protect, and with only one exception, do not impose
civil liability. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-6.1 (1990 & Supp. 1993). The criminal liability
that attaches to a failure to report typically is a misdemeanor accompanied by a fine of
$100 or less. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 1993).
6. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing systematic judicial inaction). See also Martha L,
Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language and Family Violence,
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Regardless of the law's traditional position, society needs to
protect children from abuse. This article proposes that an adult who
knows or should know of ongoing child abuse should have an af-
firmative duty to take reasonable steps to protect the child from that
abuse. If the breach of that duty is a cause in fact of the child's inju-
ries, then the adult should be liable to the child for damages under
common-law negligence doctrine. Tort liability would be a signifi-
cant step towards ensuring that children who are injured by abuse
would be compensated for their injuries. Moreover, recognition of an
affirmative duty would send a clear message that ignoring child
abuse will not be tolerated. Sending this message would go far to-
wards achieving the ultimate goal: curbing child abuse.
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. Part I
reviews the "no-duty rule," the traditional tort law principle that
people do not owe an affirmative duty to protect others. The law has
created exceptions to the no-duty rule when a person, either by vir-
tue of his relationship with another party or because of his conduct,
has a duty to act. Part I discusses these exceptions and explores
their application in the context of the potential liability of an adult
for failing to protect a child from abuse. This section demonstrates
that the no-duty rule and its exceptions do not offer adequate pro-
tection to abused children in such cases.
Part 11 further addresses the limitations of this approach
through a discussion of three well-known cases: Farwell v. Keaton,
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.,8 and DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.9 Each of these
cases pinpoints a different problem with the existing law. Together,
the three cases suggest that use of the current no-duty rule is flawed
when the issue is failure to protect from child abuse. Availability of
the exceptions does not guarantee that courts will impose liability
on adults who know of ongoing child abuse and fail to take steps to
prevent that abuse. Instead, the application of the rule and its
exceptions has allowed courts to avoid confronting the core issues
that underlie liability in these cases. This section demonstrates the
limitations of the exceptions, and concludes that the approach as a
whole risks leaving an injured child without a legal remedy.
Part III identifies the policies which underlie the imposition of
an affirmative duty of care. These policies were recently articulated
by a New Jersey court as justifying the creation of an affirmative
43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990) (making explicit the analogy between the defendants' and
courts' failure to act in DeShaney).
7. 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
8. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
9. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
1994]
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duty to prevent a person from driving drunk.10 Although this holding
is limited, the reasoning employed in that case presents a model for
courts to replace the no-duty rule with an affirmative duty of care in
a failure to protect from child abuse case. When the issue is a matter
of great public concern, such as drunk driving or child abuse, the
law should not assume that a defendant will be obligated to act
under an exception to the no-duty rule. Instead, overwhelming
policy considerations dictate that courts should impose a duty upon
defendants to use reasonable care to protect other drivers from
drunk drivers, or in the case of child abuse, to keep children from
harm. Part III also traces a parallel trend in the criminal law which
has been motivated by these policies. As this section demonstrates,
courts have been increasingly willing to interpret their states'
criminal laws to hold parents liable for failing to protect their chil-
dren from abuse.
Finally, Part IV uses two hypotheticals to explore the intrica-
cies of a negligence cause of action for failing to protect a child from
abuse. The first hypothetical considers a mother's obligation to pro-
tect her son from her boyfriend's abuse. In the second scenario, a
neighbor, who hears sounds of abuse in an adjacent apartment and
sees evidence of it, does not intervene. Liability in both cases hinges
on the existence and scope of the defendant's duty and the determi-
nation of whether the defendant is the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs
injuries. These two cases address these questions separately but
also explore the connection between duty and causation in failure to
act cases.
The Conclusion considers the extent of an adult's liability for
failure to protect a child from abuse under traditional negligence
principles. This section reiterates the policy concerns underlying the
imposition of a duty of care on adults who know of ongoing child
abuse. Although the extent of the abuse will vary, this article con-
cludes that the seriousness of the problem of child abuse warrants
that people who know of abuse take appropriate steps to prevent it.
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS: THE CURRENT RULE AND EXCEPTIONS
The current no-duty-to-rescue rule in tort law is rooted in the
early common-law distinction between misfeasance, or action, and
nonfeasance, or inaction." The law imposed a duty of care in misfea-
10. Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), rev'd, 634
A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
11. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides in relevant part: "The fact that the
actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
408 [Vol. 42
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sance cases because the defendant affirmatively acted to injure the
plaintiff. However, the law did not recognize a comparable duty in
nonfeasance cases-those in which a defendant's failure to act re-
sulted in the plaintiffs injury. 2 In part, this distinction was based
on the idea that a person should be held responsible for the conse-
quences of his conduct but not for risks which he did not create, and
thus, arguably could not control. 13
Relying on this approach, a person who knew or should have
known about ongoing child abuse would maintain that his failure to
intervene to protect the child from abuse, or in other words, his in-
action, did not give rise to a legal duty. If he had acted affirmatively,
then he could be held responsible for the consequences of his con-
duct. In a failure to act case, however, he did not create, and thus,
could not control the abuse. Therefore, he should not be held liable
for failing to protect a child from abuse.
Although some courts and commentators have emphasized the
significance of the action/inaction distinction in creating a legal
duty,14 others have not been comfortable drawing a clear line be-
tween the two.'5 In Whittaker v. Sandford,16 for example, the
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
KEETON ET AL.]. See also Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of
Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908). Bohlen emphasized the bright-line distinction:
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active
misconduct working positive injury to others and passive in action [sic], a fail-
ure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not
created by any wrongful act of the defendant.
Id. at 219.
12. KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 56, at 373.
13. Id. at 374-75.
14. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 11, at 219-21. One of the cases often cited for the
no-duty-to-rescue proposition is Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959). In that case, the
defendant dared a business invitee to jump into water and then let him drown. The court
concluded that although his conduct was morally reprehensible, the defendant owed no
legal duty to the plaintiff because his failure to rescue the drowning plaintiff was nonfea-
sance, or failure to act, rather than an affirmative act.
15. Many commentators have criticized the no-duty-to-rescue rule. See John M.
Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Cur-
rent State of the Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L.
REV. 867 (proposing that the existing no-duty to rescue rule be replaced with an affirma-
tive duty to act reasonably under the circumstances); Anthony D'Amato, The 'Bad
Samaritan' Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 798 (1975) (reconceptualizing the paradigmatic
way tort law has established a rule that there is no duty to warn or rescue); Marc A.
Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972) (exploring
the background and application of a Vermont statute extending a general duty to rescue
persons in danger); Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An
Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252,
253 (1983) (arguing that application of a duty to rescue can be "justified on individualistic
grounds"); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue, A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. &
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Supreme Court of Maine determined that a defendant's refusal to
release the plaintiff from a boat satisfied the element of an act of
physical restraint of a false imprisonment claim, and thus gave rise
to a legal duty. The defendant had invited the plaintiff onto his boat
with the assurances that she would be able to leave as soon as they
reached their destination, but then would not give her a rowboat to
reach shore. The court concluded that the refusal of promised trans-
portation to someone who had no other way to leave the boat was
the equivalent of turning a key in a lock.'7 By his failure to give the
plaintiff access to shore, the defendant in Whittaker was just as
responsible for creating, and thus controlling, a risk to the plaintiff
as if he had locked the plaintiff in the hold of the ship. 8
The Whittaker court's decision suggests that the line between
action and inaction is not a bright-line distinction. In Whittaker, the
court imposed a duty on a defendant whose misconduct could be
characterized as a failure to act. In effect, the court recognized that
no practical distinction existed in that case between affirmatively
acting to help a person in need and doing nothing in the first place.
The exceptions that have been carved out of the no-duty rule further
underscore the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing between action
and inaction and signal courts' discomfort with the current no-duty
rule.19
MARY L. REV. 423 (1985) (noting that countries not following the common law have had
little resistance to finding a public duty to rescue and proposing a model "Duty to Render
Aid" statute); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980)
(examining the legal, ethical, moral, economic and philosophical arguments for and
against a general duty to rescue); Jack Wenik, Forcing the Bystander to Get Involved: A
Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime, 94 YALE L.J. 1787 (1985)
(proposing criminal liability upon eyewitnesses for falling to report felonies).
16. 85 A. 399 (Me. 1912).
17. The court compared action to inaction: "The boat is the key. By refusing the boat
he turns the key. The guest is as effectually locked up as if there were walls along the
sides of the vessel." Id. at 402.
18. Id.
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 314A, 314B, 321, 322, 324. To fully illustrate
the point it is helpful to read the listed Restatement sections in conjunction with one an-
other. They ard:
§ 314A. Special Relationships Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to
members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal oppor-
tunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
1994] BREAKING THE SILENCE
The law recognizes a duty to exercise reasonable care if any one
of the exceptions to the no-duty rule is met.2° One type of exception
examines the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
21
This special relationship exception imposes an affirmative duty on
the defendant to protect the plaintiff even though the defendant's
conduct did not create the risk to the plaintiff.22 According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, special relationships exist between
common carriers and their passengers, innkeepers and their guests,
landholders and their invitees, and masters and servants.2- In addi-
tion, a special relationship is created between "[o]ne who is required
by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportuni-
ties for protection."2 Although the Restatement does not identify
§ 314B. Duty to Protect Endangered or Hurt Employee
(1) If a servant, while acting within the scope of his employment, comes into a
position of imminent danger of serious harm and this is known to the master or
to a person who has duties of management, the master is subject to liability to a
failure by himself or by such person to exercise reasonable care to avert the
threatened harm.
(2) If a servant is hurt and thereby becomes helpless when acting within the
scope of his employment and this is known to the master or to a person having
duties of management, the master is subject to liability for his negligent failure
or that of such person to give first aid to the servant and to care for him until he
can be cared for by others.
§ 321. Duty to Act When Prior Conduct is Found to be Dangerous
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it
has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical ha rm to another, he is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time of the act
the actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk.
§ 322. Duty to Aid Another Harmed by Actor's Conduct
If the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether tortious
or innocent, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless
and in danger of further harm, the actor is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent such further harm.
§ 324. Duty of One Who Takes Charge of Another Who is Helpless
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless
adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any
bodily harm caused to him by
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of
the other while within the actor's charge, or
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves
the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him.
Id.
20. See KEETONETAL., supra note 11, § 56, at 376-77.
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 314A.
22. KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 56, at 376.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 314A
24. Id. See also KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 56, at 374 (noting that the obligation
is imposed on a "limited group of relations, in which custom, public sentiment and views
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who falls within this last category, courts and commentators have
interpreted it to include familial relationships, such as parents and
children, and husbands and wives.25
In some instances, it might be demonstrated that an adult who
fails to protect a child from abuse has a special relationship with
that child. If the adult is the child's parent, then she is required by
law to be responsible for the child in her custody.26 If the adult is
another relative or a babysitter, then she may still fall within this
special relationship category as someone who has "voluntarily
take[n] custody" of the child.17 A person might be said to have volun-
tarily taken custody of a child by the fact of living in the same resi-
dence as the child. Other people who observe the abuse of a child,
however, may not have voluntarily taken custody of that child, and
thus, may not fall within the special relationship exception. For ex-
ample, a stranger on the street who witnesses the abuse is unlikely
to have the kind of connection with the child that could be charac-
terized as a special relationship. Nevertheless, that person should
not be able to turn away from what she has seen. Children may
reasonably expect the adults with whom they come in contact to
protect them from harm. If these adults do not act, they should not
be absolved of responsibility simply because they do not fit within
the special relationship exception to the no-duty rule.
Another exception serves as a corollary to the special relation-
ship exception. In some cases, a duty arises when the rescuer and
the victim are strangers, but the rescuer has a relationship with the
person who is threatening the victim.2" The duty created under this
exception differs in one respect from the one imposed under the
special relationship exception. In this case, the defendant's duty is
of social policy have led the courts to find a duty of affirmative action.").
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 56, at 377 and cases cited therein. Early com-
mentators recognized a duty limited to furnishing necessities that was created by a family
relationship:
[A]dmitting the existence of the duty in its broadest scope, it is predicated upon
the ability of the one upon whom the duty is alleged to rest to afford the neces-
sary protection and the dependence and helplessness of him who claims that the
duty is owing to him. It is certain also that the family relation must exist;
neither mere association without such relation nor a meretricious relationship
creates such a duty.
Bohlen, supra note 11, at 227.
26. Statutes in every state impose a duty of financial support on parents. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 196, 196a (West Supp. 1988). In addition, every state has enacted child
abuse and neglect laws to protect children when parents fail to meet their responsibili-
ties. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300, 363 (West Supp. 1987).
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 314A.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 315. For example, most states hold parents
liable to third parties for the torts of their children. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 123, at 913.
412 [Vol. 42
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not to protect the victim but to control the dangerous individual. 29
The law seeks to impose liability for failure to act on a defendant
who fails to control someone with whom she has a special relation-
ship, and thus, a legal obligation to control.30 This exception might
not consistently be found to apply to a defendant in a failure to pro-
tect from child abuse case.3 The defendant who observes the abuse
may not have a relationship with the abuser that allows her to con-
trol his conduct, and even if she does, the defendant may not be able
to control someone who is already violent.
The remaining exceptions focus on the defendant's conduct
rather than on his relationships, and arguably, could be character-
ized as involving action rather than inaction.2 As such, the courts
have analyzed these exceptions under traditional negligence princi-
ples 3 The courts' willingness to view these cases as involving the
defendant's action rather than his inaction emphasizes the precari-
ousness of the distinction and argues in favor of an approach which
replaces the exceptions with a general duty of care.
One such exception arises when an actor creates a risk that
puts others in danger.' As noted above, a major reason for not im-
posing liability for inaction is the assumption that the defendant has
not engaged in risk-creating behavior. 5 If a defendant has engaged
in such behavior, the exception converts the defendant's conduct
from inaction to action, thereby placing it outside of the no-duty
rule. An adult who fails to protect a child from ongoing abuse would
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 315. This section provides:
There is no duty to so control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another person unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right to protection.
Id.
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 317-320.
31. See Fisher v. Metcalf, 543 So.2d 785, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In Fisher,
the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a cause of action brought by children
against their father's psychiatrist for failing to report child abuse. In addition to deter-
mining that the psychiatrist did not owe a duty to the children under state statutes, the
court considered and rejected the children's claim of a common-law duty under Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 315. The court concluded that the psychiatrist did not have the
ability to control the father's behavior and that the psychiatrist's reporting obligation did
not create a special relationship between the children and him.
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 321, 322, 324.
33. See State Dep't of Highway Safety v. Kropff, 491 So.2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (concluding that a police officer who had undertaken to secure an accident
scene had a duty to use reasonable care to protect people on the scene).
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 321, 322.
35. See supra text accompanying note 13.
19941 413
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fall into this category if his behavior is considered to create a risk
that puts the child in danger. If, however, the abuser is identified as
the risk-creator, a court would not find that the defendant's inaction
falls within this exception to the no-duty rule.
The final exception imposes a duty of care when one has under-
taken to assist someone in need. 6 This exception applies in cases
where a person has begun to assist another and the person being
helped relies on that assistance. One rationale for this exception is
that having undertaken the assistance, a defendant may have de-
prived the victim of the assistance of others. Adults who have
started to intervene in an abusive situation and then have stopped,
or who have otherwise discouraged others from intervening by their
own efforts, may fall within this exception. The issue is whether
these individuals have "taken charge" of the situation in a way that
legally obligates them to continue such aid to the injured party.37 A
court might have to define "taken charge" broadly to include an
adult who has failed to prevent ongoing abuse. However, enlarging
the scope of that concept might cause people to turn away from
ongoing abuse. Rather than getting involved in the first place, they
might simply ignore their suspicions. If they do not act at all, people
who do nothing about abuse cannot be seen as "taking charge" of the
situation. Judicial use of this exception might discourage such
people from trying to stop what they know is happening.
Even with the host of exceptions to the no-duty rule, the cur-
rent approach does not adequately protect children from abuse.
Under the general rule, a duty of care is imposed if the defendant
acted. The defendant can be liable for inaction if he fits within one of
the exceptions to the no-duty rule. The line between action and
inaction and the contours of the exceptions may be malleable enough
to permit courts to impose liability on a person who observes but
does nothing about child abuse. However, courts are unlikely to
extend such liability in a consistent manner. Thus, the existing rule
and exceptions do not guarantee that a defendant's failure to act will
amount to legal liability towards the child. Therefore, the possibility
remains that this approach could produce an unacceptable result: it
could leave an abused child without a remedy against the person
who stood by silently while the abuse took place.
II. CONFRONTING THE PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
The three cases discussed below offer different approaches to
the no-duty rule and exceptions. 8 Each decision has been criticized,
36. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 324.
37. Id.
38. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989);
414 [Vol. 42
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and the controversy surrounding these cases goes beyond their par-
ticular facts to the nature of the no-duty rule itself.39 Each court's
varying treatment of the rule and exceptions in these three cases
coupled with negative reaction to the decisions suggests the need to
replace the no-duty rule with an affirmative duty of care for adults
who fail to protect children from abuse.
A. Expanding the Exceptions to the No-Duty Rule: Farwell v.
Keaton
One Michigan Supreme Court decision shows how far that
court was willing to go to expand the exceptions to the no-duty rule.
In Farwell v. Keaton, ° the Michigan high court upheld a jury verdict
which imposed an affirmative duty on a sixteen-year-old defendant
to seek medical attention for his injured friend.4' AfLer consuming
five or six beers, the two boys got into an altercation with a group of
six other boys which led to the plaintiff, Richard Farwell, being
severely beaten.42 Siegrist, the defendant in question, applied an ice
pack to Farwell's head after he found Farwell underneath a car fol-
lowing the fight. Siegrist proceeded to drive Farwell around for a
couple of hours, and then left him asleep in the back seat of a car in
his grandparents' driveway. Farwell's grandparents found him
unconscious in the car the next morning, and he died in a hospital
three days later.43 At trial, a neurosurgeon testified that Farwell
probably would not have died had he received medical attention the
night before.'
The court found that either of two exceptions to the no-duty
rule might apply in this case. First, the court determined that Sie-
grist had started to help Farwell and that Farwell was relying on
Siegrist's aid. Siegrist had "taken charge" of the situation by putting
ice on Farwell's head and driving him around.45 When Siegrist
abandoned Farwell overnight in the car, he deprived him of the as-
sistance of others. Thus, Siegrist's partial assistance left Farwell
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Farwell v. Keaton, 240
N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
39. See Minow, supra note 6, at 1675 (criticizing Justice Rehnquist's formalistic ap-
proach in DeShaney); Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976) (taking issue with the Tarasoff court's as-
sumption that therapists can predict violence and protect their patients' potential vic-
tims); Adler, supra note 15, at 877 & n.42 (discussing the jurisprudence of Farwell).
40. Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
41. Id. at 222.
42. Id. at 218.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 220.
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worse off than he would have been otherwise.46
Second, the court found that the special relationship exception
would include Siegrist and Farwell, even though they were not in-
volved in one of the traditionally identified special relationships. 47
Because Siegrist and Farwell were "companions on a social venture,"
the court found that Siegrist had voluntarily taken custody of the
injured Farwell in a way that deprived him of other opportunities
for protection.' The court imposed a duty on Siegrist under the spe-
cial relationship exception to encourage people engaged in a common
endeavor to help their friends in need. To allow someone who can
help another without endangering himself to escape legal liability
would be "'shocking to humanitarian considerations' and [would] fly
in the face of 'the commonly accepted code of social conduct."' 49
The dissenting opinion challenged the majority's analysis of
both exceptions. 0 First, the dissent refused to accept the majority's
finding that Siegrist had voluntarily assumed the duty of caring for
Farwell." In the dissent's view, nothing in the evidence suggested
that Siegrist should have understood the seriousness of Farwell's
injuries; only a trained physician could diagnose them. Since Far-
well did not complain about them, Siegrist's conclusion that Farwell
was sleeping because he was tired, not because he had suffered
massive head injuries, was reasonable.5 Therefore, the evidence did
not support either of the majority's conclusions: that Siegrist offered
assistance, or that Farwell relied on such a representation.
In addition, the dissent rejected the majority's expansion of the
special relationship exception "which elevates a moral obligation to
the level of a legal duty."53 The court noted that mere social com-
panions are not "co-adventurers" who engage in a dangerous venture
with the expectation that they will take care of each other. 4 Absent
further evidence that Farwell depended on Siegrist for assistance,
the dissent reasoned, the court should not impose an affirmative
duty of care on Siegrist to help Farwell. Thus, the dissent main-
tained that Siegrist behaved reasonably under the circumstances
46. Id.
47. Id. at 222; see supra text accompanying notes 21-31.
48. Id. at 222 ("Under these circumstances, to say that Siegrist had no duty to ob-
tain medical assistance or at least to notify someone of Farwell's condition and where-
abouts would be 'shocking to humanitarian considerations' and fly in the face of 'the
commonly accepted code of social conduct.'" (quoting Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103,
106 (6th Cir. 1947))).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 224 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 224 & n.2.
53. Id. at 224.
54. Id. at 224 n.4.
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and should not be held accountable for Farwell's death.
In spite of the dissent's remonstrances, however, the Farwell
majority was not reluctant to impose liability on a friend who failed
to seek assistance for his companion's injuries. It follows, therefore,
that a court would consider adults who fail to seek assistance for a
child's injuries to be equally culpable. In a failure to protect from
abuse case, a plaintiff could argue that a duty of care has been
created under either of the Farwell exceptions. First, by her
awareness of the abuse, the adult held herself out as being able to
help the abused child, and the child relied on that assistance. The
defendant "took charge" of the situation when she decided not to do
anything about the abuse. Like Siegrist who abandoned Farwell
without telling anyone that he needed medical attention, the adult
in this case has abandoned the child-plaintiff to the abuser when
she does not seek medical attention for him or did not do anything to
stop the abuse. Just as Siegrist's decision to leave Farwell
unattended in the car hid his injuries from others, so too does the
defendant's decision not to act help to hide the child's injuries from
the rest of the world. Quite possibly, the defendant's conduct left the
child worse off than if she had not been involved.
Furthermore, if the special relationship exception includes so-
cial companions, then it also includes many relationships between
the abused child and the adults who fail to protect that child. Far-
well and Siegrist were together only for an evening, yet that connec-
tion was sufficient to establish Siegrist's duty to help his injured
friend. Someone who is aware of ongoing child abuse has at least the
level of connection with the child that Siegrist had with Farwell-
and probably a greater one. Moreover, the nature of the relationship
is more compelling because it is between a child and an adult as op-
posed to between two adults. A child relies on adults around him for
care and protection. These adults are in the best position to protect
the children around them. Indeed, the adults are often the only ve-
hicle for protection available to the child; therefore, it would "fly in
the face of 'the commonly accepted code of social conduct' 55 if these
adults were not required to provide that protection.
If courts were to follow Farwell, then perhaps they would im-
pose liability for failure to protect a child from abuse under one of
the exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule. Yet, most courts have
declined to adopt Farwell's expansive reading of the exceptions;
instead, Farwell stands at the outer reaches of negligence law.5
6
55. Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
56. Recent decisions suggest that courts are interpreting the exceptions narrowly to
limit defendants' liability. See, e.g., Martin v. Shea, 463 N.E.2d 1092, 1093 (Ind. 1984)
(holding that host had no duty to control the conduct of his guests for the safety of other
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Courts may prefer to read the exceptions to the no-duty rule more
narrowly for a variety of reasons, including consideration of the
historical boundaries of the exceptions, fear of eroding the no-duty
rule, and concern about the inconsistent applications and unpredic-
table results that broad interpretations would produce. This reluc-
tance to follow Farwell underscores the need to replace the no-duty
rule and its exceptions with a workable alternative which encour-
ages the prevention of child abuse by extending liability to persons
who might have stopped it. As currently implemented, the no-duty
rule and its exceptions fail to reach the heart of the problem: the
need to impose liability on those who fail to protect children from
abuse. By rejecting Farwell's broad reading of the special relation-
ship exception, courts may be able to avoid imposing liability on
people who remain silent when confronted with child abuse.
B. Exploring the Inconsistencies in the Exceptions: Tarasoffv.
Regents of the University of California
A famous case decided contemporaneously with Farwell points
out the inconsistencies that plague application of the current rule
and exceptions. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia,57 the Supreme Court of California considered negligence claims
against the university board of regents, campus psychologists and
campus police after a former psychiatric outpatient at the campus
hospital killed his ex-girlfriend. The defendant-therapist had been
seeing Prosenjit Poddar on an outpatient basis. When Poddar told
his therapist that he intended to kill his former girlfriend, the
therapist notified both his superior and campus police. The campus
police questioned Poddar but did not detain him because they did
not think that he was dangerous . 8 The therapist's superior deter-
mined that no further action had to be taken, and Poddar never saw
the therapist again. Two months later, Poddar murdered his former
guests); Ashburn v. Ann Arundel County, 510 A.2d 1078 (Md. 1986) (concluding that a
police officer owed no duty of care to a pedestrian struck by a drunk driver even though
the officer had detected the driver's condition before the accident); Hammers v. Farm
Bureau Town & Country, 792 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that insurance com-
pany that provided automobile insurance to a senile woman did not have a duty of care
arising from a special relationship either with the insured or with the person injured by
the insured); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) (holding that parents whose
child was sexually molested by a babysitter had no cause of action against state and
county officials who suspected that abuse was taking place and were investigating the
babysitter, the state had no special relationship with either the babysitter or the child-
victim that would give rise to a duty to warn the child's parents).
57. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
58. Id. at 339-40.
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girlfriend, Tatiana Tarasoff.5 9 Her parents sued, alleging among
other theories, negligent failure to protect their daughter.
The court determined that the defendant-therapist was liable
for failing to protect Tatiana Tarasoff from Prosenjit Poddar's
violence."0 In determining that the therapist owed Tarasoff a duty of
care, the court ostensibly relied on the special relationship exception
to the no-duty rule. The court noted that the therapist's duty could
be established through his relationship with either Poddar-"the
person whose conduct needs to be controlled"--or Tarasoff-"the fore-
seeable victim of that conduct."61 Although the court concluded that
the therapist's relationship with his patient established the duty,
the duty was not to control his patient, Poddar. Instead, the court
departed from the Restatement provisions and concluded that the
relationship between the therapist and Poddar gave rise to a duty to
protect Tarasoff.62 The court, however, declined without explanation
to find that a similar special relationship existed between the police
and either Tarasoff or Poddar that would give rise to a legal duty.63
The Tarasoff court concluded that the special relationship be-
tween therapist and patient gave rise to the therapist's duty of care
in two ways. First, the court reasoned, the relationship gave the
therapist the opportunity to detect the danger to the victim.64
Second, once the danger had been detected, the relationship enabled
the therapist to protect the victim from the patient's dangerous con-
duct. 5 An examination of these bases for the duty, however, reveals
that the duty arises in spite of, not because of, the special relation-
ship which existed between Poddar and his therapist.
First, the defendant is not in a better position to detect danger
to the victim because he is the patient's therapist. The Tarasoff
court acknowledged how difficult it is for a therapist to predict
59. Id. at 339.
60. Id. at 342-49.
61. Id. at 343.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 21-31 for a discussion of the special relation-
ship exceptions. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a duty of care arises
from either "(a) a special relation... between the actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special rela-
tion ... between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection."
RESTATEMENTsupra note 11, § 315.
63. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 349.
64. Id. at 345 ("[The pleadings do not raise any question as to failure of defendant
therapists to predict that Poddar presented a serious danger of violence. On the contrary,
the present complaints allege that defendant therapists did in fact predict that Poddar
would kill.... ").
65. Id. ("In our view,... once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious
danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger.").
1994]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
whether or not his patient presents a serious risk of violence to
another person.' Moreover, even if the therapist can detect danger
to the victim, the therapist's confidential relationship with his
patient may undermine his ability to protect the victim. The
Tarasoff court did not follow Restatement principles and impose a
duty on the therapist to control his patient; 7 instead, the court
recognized a broader "duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger."8 The court suggested that using
reasonable care could include warning the intended victim or those
close to the victim, notifying the police or taking "whatever other
steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances."69
All of these steps jeopardize the therapist-patient relationship
because they demand that the therapist reveal his patient's confi-
dences. A patient must believe that he can confide his innermost se-
crets to his therapist without fear of disclosure. The therapist, in
turn, earns the trust of his patient by guaranteeing the confiden-
tiality of their conversations. Legislatures have recognized the need
for confidentiality between therapist and patient with evidentiary
privileges and laws, such as California's Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act,70 which defines a therapist's duty to withhold confidential in-
formation. 1 The Tarasoff court acknowledged that the confidential
nature of the relationship allows patients to confide violent fantasies
which they do not plan to carry out.72 However, requiring a therapist
to disclose his patient's confidential communications without any
proof that the information in these disclosures is accurate jeopar-
dizes this relationship unjustifiably.
The same court that used the special relationship exception to
impose a duty of care on a therapist did not find that a similar spe-
cial relationship existed between the campus police and either Pod-
dar or Tarasoff. Although the police had Poddar in their custody,
determined that he "appeared rational," and released him, the court
found that the police owed no duty of care.73 However, the two cri-
teria on which the court relied for establishing the therapist's duty
66. Id. ("We recognize the difficulty that a therapist encounters in attempting to
forecast whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence.").
67. Even if the court had imposed the duty to control, it would have been difficult for
the therapist to meet that obligation. He had recommended that the campus police detain
Poddar, and they did but soon released him. He had not seen Poddar for the two months
before Poddar killed Tarasoff, and Poddar had only been an outpatient. Id. at 339-41.
68. Id. at 345.
69. Id. at 340.
70. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5328-5329 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
71. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 348. See also Stone, supra note 39, at 366-69 (discussing
the importance of confidentiality in the therapist-patient relationship).
72. Id. at 347.
73. Id. at 339-40.
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under the special relationship exception are more than met by the
police officers. First, whereas the court found it significant that the
therapist had an opportunity to assess Poddar's danger, it mini-
mized the role of the police, whose job requires that they determine
whether someone presents a danger to others. The campus police did
make such a determination; however, they misjudged Poddar when
they concluded that he "appeared rational." 4 Second, unlike thera-
pists, police officers are charged with protecting others from harm.
The campus police failed to protect Tarasoff from Poddar. Thus, the
court easily could have concluded that the campus police fit within
the special relationship exception and owed Tarasoff a duty of pro-
tection. Because the court did not reach that conclusion, the duty of
care must have originated outside of the special relationship excep-
tion.
The therapist's duty of care was created in part because of the
urgency of a problem that the Tarasoff court identified several times
as the "public interest in safety from violent assault."75 The court's
desire to protect the public from violence overcame competing
concerns about the ability and desirability of therapists detecting
dangerous patients and protecting potential victims from harm.
Similarly, the urgency of the problem of child abuse requires that a
duty of care be imposed on people who know of ongoing child abuse
and do nothing to protect the child from the abuse. As the Tarasoff
opinion demonstrates, the special relationship exception produces
inconsistent results; the court imposed a duty of care on therapists,
but not on the campus police. A legacy from Tarasoff is that courts
should abandon the pretense of finding a duty through constructs
such as the special relationship, and instead, should establish a
duty to protect based on the overwhelming public need to curb child
abuse.
C. Avoiding the Implications of the No-Duty Rule: DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services
The United States Supreme Court did not heed the lesson of
Tarasoff-that a reliance on the no-duty rule and exceptions can be
misplaced-when it decided DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services.76 In DeShaney, the Court considered
whether a county social services agency was liable under the sub-
stantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for
74. Id.
75. Id. at 346. The court also stated: "The risk that unnecessary warnings may be
given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved." Id.
"The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." Id. at 347.
76. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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failure to protect a child from his father's repeated beatings. The
Court had to determine whether the agency had a duty to protect
the child either because it had acted in a way that gave rise to an
affirmative obligation to protect the child or because it had formed a
special relationship with the child. Although the issue of the
agency's duty arose under substantive Due Process, the Court's
analysis relied on the principles of the no-duty rule and its
exceptions. In determining that the state did not violate the child's
Due Process rights, the Court failed to confront the core issue: the
willingness of the legal system to let a wrong go unrighted. 7
The "undeniably tragic""8 facts of DeShaney involved the
repeated abuse of four-year old Joshua DeShaney by his father,
Randy. The local department of social services (DSS) learned of the
beatings through a variety of sources: Randy's second wife (who was
not Joshua's mother), its own caseworker, 79 emergency room person-
nel, 0 neighbors, and the police."' After first hearing about the abuse
from Randy's second wife, DSS interviewed Randy but did not follow
up.8 2 Neighbors also reported to the police that they had seen or
heard Randy beating Joshua, and the police relayed the information
to DSS. 3 DSS received further notice of the abuse from emergency
room personnel when Joshua was taken to the hospital after a
severe beating.' DSS investigated and decided not to remove Joshua
from the home; Randy agreed to get support services for himself and
Joshua.8 A month later, Joshua was taken to the emergency room
77. Of course, DeShaney can be read as a pure federalism case. See, e.g., James T. R.
Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police
After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1990) (pointing out the "federalism-based nar-
rowness" of the DeShaney decision). However, this case is not about whether the state of
Wisconsin had a right to decide if it should act; it is about a state that, having acted,
promised to do something and then reneged on that promise. "Wisconsin law invites-
indeed, directs-citizens and other governmental entities to depend on local departments
of social services... to protect children from abuse." DeShaney, 489 U.S, at 208
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that Wisconsin's system acted in a way
similar to the rescuer who abandons the rescue: "[C]hildren like Joshua are made worse
off by the existence of this program when the persons or entities charged with carrying it
out fall to do their jobs." Id. at 210. In that regard, the state is similar to the parent who,
by virtue of her presence in the home, has agreed to protect children from abuse and then
does not do so. See infra part IV.A.(1)-(4).
78. 489 U.S. at 191.
79. Id. at 192-93.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 192.
83. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 192.
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for a second time with "suspicious injuries." 6 DSS was again noti-
fied, and again decided not to remove Joshua from the home. A DSS
caseworker visited the DeShaney home monthly during the next six
months. She noted that Randy was not complying with the terms of
the voluntary agreement that he had entered into with the agency.
She also observed "a number of suspicious injuries on Joshua's
head," noted her "continuing suspicions" of abuse, but "did nothing
more."87 Emergency room personnel contacted DSS for a third time
after Joshua was again treated for more injuries that "they believed
[were] caused by child abuse."8 This time, when the DSS caseworker
visited the DeShaney home, she was told that Joshua was too sick to
see her. Once again, she did nothing. 9 A few months later, Randy
beat Joshua into a coma: Joshua sustained brain damage so severe
that he will probably live in an institution for the profoundly re-
tarded for the rest of his life."
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
determined that DSS's conduct did not violate Joshua DeShaney's
substantive Due Process rights because the state had merely failed
to act.9 The only remaining question was whether the state had
entered into a special relationship with Joshua DeShaney which
would impose an affirmative duty of protection on it. The Court
concluded that this duty arises under the special relationship ex-
ception only "when the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will."9 The Court reasoned that unlike
other situations involving prisoners or state mental patients,93 the
state did not have Joshua physically in its custddy against his will
when the beatings occurred. Therefore, the state had not entered
into the kind of relationship that would make it legally responsible
for his safety.94 The majority concluded that as "undeniably tragic"
as the facts of DeShaney were, DSS was not liable although it "stood
by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more
active role for [it] .9
86. Id.
87. Id. at 192-93.
88. Id. at 193.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 194-95.
92. Id. at 199-200.
93. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (establishing that Due
Process requires that the state provide medical care for prisoners because they cannot do
so for themselves); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that a mentally
retarded person involuntarily committed to a state institution has constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-01.
95. Id. at 203.
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It is unclear whether an adult who stands by and does nothing
in the face of child abuse would be liable under Justice Rehnquist's
majority's analysis in DeShaney. Clearly, the Due Process Clause
would not be at issue because the state would not be a party to the
case, but the question of common-law tort liability remains open.9
When considering such liability, a court could conclude that a
special relationship giving rise to a legal duty exists between the
person who knows of the abuse and the abused child. The custody
requirement may be satisfied if the child is in that adult's care, and
the child is held against his will because he has no reasonable
means of escape from the abuse. However, if custody means control,
then the adult might argue that she was not in control of the child
when the abuse took place; the abuser controlled the situation. The
defendant's lack of control is more justifiable if she is not related to
the child, and the child is being abused by a parent.
To the extent that Justice Rehnquist's opinion would provide
guidance to state courts deciding tort cases, his reading of the
special relationship exception leaves open the possibility of liability
for adults who fail to protect abused children but does not guarantee
the imposition of a duty under that exception. In fact, he notes the
danger of yielding to "natural sympathy in a case like this to find a
way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate compensation for
the grievous harm inflicted upon them."97 For Justice Rehnquist,
then, judges, like social workers, can stand by and watch a wrong go
unrighted. 5 Just as the social worker ignored Joshua's cries for
help, so too can the Court turn a deaf ear to those pleas. The danger
of the majority's narrow reading of the state's obligation under the
Due Process Clause to protect Joshua DeShaney is that it will be
used as precedent to limit the liability under state tort law of indi-
viduals who fail to protect children like Joshua from abuse.
In dissent, Justice Brennan rejected the majority's premise that
the state did not have a duty because it had not acted-because it, in
Justice Rehnquist's words, "stood by and did nothing." 9 Instead,
Justice Brennan began by evaluating "the action that Wisconsin
ha[d] taken with respect to Joshua and children like him, rather
than on the actions that the State ha[d] failed to take."1 0 Drawing
96. A scenario left unresolved by DeShaney is the case of a foster parent who looks
the other way while a third party abuses her foster child. The Court did not reach the
question of the state's liability under the Due Process Clause for a foster parent's failure
to protect her child from abuse. See id. at 201 n.9.
97. Id. at 202-03.
98. But see infra text accompanying notes 106-08 for a discussion of Justice Black-
mun's dissenting opinion. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 203 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
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on the same facts, Justice Brennan saw action where the majority
saw only inaction.'0 ' On one level, Justice Brennan's opinion can be
seen as construing "action" broadly under the current no-duty rule,
thereby placing the state's conduct within it. On another level,
however, Justice Brennan invites a new outlook on the existing
system: one which rejects the action/inaction distinction and
evaluates the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct to
determine if a duty exists.
For Justice Brennan, the state's duty arose when it represented
to the public that it had taken care of the problem of Randy De-
Shaney abusing his son, Joshua, and that for that reason others
need not worry about his welfare. The state had established a child
abuse reporting system which "invit[ed]-indeed, direct[ed]-
citizens and other governmental entities to depend on local depart-
ments of social services such as [DSS] to protect children from
abuse."102 All of the people who reported Randy's abuse of Joshua to
the agency-the police, Randy's second wife, neighbors and emer-
gency room personnel-believed that the state would protect Joshua
from harm 0 3 When the state assured the public through the enact-
ment of its statutory scheme that it would protect Joshua and others
like him, it became obligated to keep its promise. Yet, despite its
awareness that Joshua was being abused, the state did not inter-
vene to protect him. Joshua's social worker, assigned by DSS, had
"continuing suspicions that someone in the DeShaney household
was physically abusing Joshua,"0 4 and was not surprised by his
injuries: "'I just knew the phone would ring some day and Joshua
would be dead.'" 10 5 She did not, however, take steps to remove
Joshua from the home. Thus, the state failed to fulfill its duty to
protect Joshua DeShaney.
Under Brennan's reading of DeShaney, adults who know about
ongoing child abuse and fail to take action owe a duty under a broad
definition of "action." These adults have acted if, by their silence,
they represent to others that the abuse is either not serious or is
101. See supra note 77.
102. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 209-10. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated:
[A] private citizen, or even a person working in a government agency other than
DSS, would doubtless feel that her job Was done as soon as she had reported her
suspicions of child abuse to DSS. Through its child-welfare program, in other
words, the State of Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental
bodies other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything
more than report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS.
Id.
104. Id. at 193.
105. Id. at 209 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812
F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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under control. The reason they have "acted" within the meaning of
the law is that this representation could cause others, even though
they suspect abuse, to do nothing because they defer to the judgment
of one who they assume would have actually observed the abuse.
Thus, if adults who know about abuse tacitly offer assurances that
all is well, the law should require that they back up those
assurances with action. Adults who do not report abuse, who do not
intervene while abuse is taking place, and who do not seek medical
attention for an abused child have harmed the child. Like the social
worker and DSS in Brennan's view of DeShaney, these adults have
acted in a way that created an affirmative duty of care; they violated
that duty when they failed to follow through on their initial repre-
sentations.
Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissenting opinion, agreed
with Justice Brennan's characterization of the state's behavior as
action rather than as inaction. 06 Moreover, for Justice Blackmun,
the duty to act affirmatively was not confined to the social worker
and DSS. In Blackmun's view, the Court itself also failed in its duty
to Joshua-the duty to right the wrong that had been done to him.
Justice Blackmun compared his brethren to pre-Civil War judges,
who claimed that the law prevented them from compensating fugi-
tive slaves for their injuries.07 Like those judges, Blackmun ex-
plained, this Supreme Court maintained that it was unable to act
under the existing no-duty rule and exceptions. Rejecting this sterile
formalism, Justice Blackmun advocated a different approach: "a
'sympathetic' reading, one which comports with dictates of funda-
mental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled
from the province of judging."0 8
Blackmun's "sympathetic reading" would not allow adults to
stand by silently and watch children get abused under any circum-
stances. If the current no-duty rule and exceptions can be inter-
preted in a way that covers a household member's failure to protect
a child being abused in the home, then he probably would accept
that approach to the problem. However, the divergent opinions
authored by Justices Rehnquist and Brennan make clear that
judges can interpret the same rule, yet reach different results. Jus-
tice Blackmun would not endorse an approach which produces such
inconsistent results because it would not adequately protect abused
106. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("As Justice Brennan demonstrates, the
facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the life of Joshua
DeShaney-intervention that triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State
learned of the severe danger to which he was exposed.").
107. Id. (arguing that "formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the
broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment").
108. Id. at 213 (quoting ALAN STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 262 (1984)).
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children.0 9 Therefore, he might consider abandoning the current
approach and replacing it with an affirmative duty of care on adults
to protect children from abuse.
The progression in DeShaney-from Justice Rehnquist's to
Justice Blackmun's opinion-was from inaction to action, and from
ignoring to accepting responsibility. For Justice Rehnquist, the fail-
ure of the social worker and county department of social services to
act was justified because they were not legally responsible for
Joshua DeShaney. Justice Brennan, however, did not excuse their
refusal to accept responsibility. He did not see their conduct as a
failure to act; rather, he found that they acted when they signaled to
others that they would be responsible for any investigation of abuse,
and then failed to follow through on their findings. Justice Black-
mun expanded the scope of responsibility to include a justice system
which failed to provide a remedy where a wrong had been commit-
ted. The reasoning of Justices Brennan and Blackmun permits the
inference that if social workers, county agencies and courts must ac-
cept responsibility for a child who is being abused, then certainly an
adult who knows about such abuse should also accept such respon-
sibility. This person, perhaps a relative or even a parent, should be
held responsible for failing to protect that child from that abuse.
Even Justice Rehnquist suggested that a remedy against those
who fail to protect children from abuse could come through state tort
law.110 Justice Rehnquist intimated that the state of Wisconsin
might wish to hold itself responsible in tort for failure to protect
children from the abuse. Yet, there is an irony in this call to find a
special relationship in tort when he could not find one through the
Due Process Clause. As states consider who should be held respon-
sible for this type of abuse after DeShaney, they may be inclined to
hold adults who know of such abuse liable instead of themselves ac-
cepting or sharing such responsibility. Yet, in creating this liability
against these adults under the current no-duty rule, state courts
would face the same difficulties that the DeShaney Court faced dis-
tinguishing action from inaction and fitting a defendant's conduct
into one of the exceptions to the rule."' Furthermore, the no-duty
approach may fail to reach the underlying problem: the protection of
children from abuse. The solution to the current rule's inadequacies
is to replace the no-duty rule and exceptions with an affirmative
duty of care.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 201-02 ("It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect
Joshua against a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State acquired a
duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against that danger.").
111. See supra part I for a discussion of the current approach and its problems.
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As demonstrated above, the current no-duty rule and excep-
tions do not adequately address the urgent problem of preventing
child abuse. Farwell and subsequent cases indicate that the excep-
tions must be interpreted broadly to impose a duty for failure to act,
and in many cases, the courts are reluctant to do so. Tarasoff
demonstrates that reliance on an exception to the no-duty rule can
be dangerously misplaced; a duty is established in spite of, not
because of, the special relationship exception. Furthermore, the
exceptions can be interpreted inconsistently to impose a duty on
some groups, but not on others. Finally, the Supreme Court's
decision in DeShaney illustrates the failure of the current approach
to right a wrong in the child abuse context. This failure, however, is
not inevitable. If the courts fashion a narrowly-tailored affirmative
duty of care to apply in the special context of abuse of children, then
plaintiffs such as Joshua DeShaney would be provided with a
remedy for the wrong committed against them. In addition, such a
rule would advance the ultimate goal-curbing child abuse.
Therefore, the sweep of these three cases suggests that courts
should replace the no-duty rule with an affirmative duty of care for
people who know or should have known of ongoing child abuse and
fail to take reasonable steps to protect the child.
IiI. ESTABLISHING AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF CARE
A. The Policy Rationale
The recognition of an affirmative duty comports with long-
standing policies that underlie a general duty of care. One commen-
tator identified these policies as "morality, the economic good of the
group, practical administration of the law, justice as between the
parties and other considerations relative to the environment out of
which the case arose."112 These policies support imposing a duty of
care on adults who know about abuse to take steps to prevent it.
First, morality considerations dictate that people should take
care of each other.13 The obligation to assist abused children arises
out of the "natural responsibilities of social living and human rela-
tions .... "114 Adults who know about ongoing child abuse should
112. Leon Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42, 45 (1962).
See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 at 325-26 (4th ed.
1971) ("[Dluty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled
to protection."); Adler, supra note 15, at 901-04 (proposing that an affirmative duty of care
based on policy considerations replace the traditional no-duty rule).
. 113. See infra pait III.B. for a discussion of Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), rev'd, 634 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
114. Wytupeck v. Camden, 136 A.2d 887, 893 (N.J. 1957).
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take care of abused children by trying to stop the abuse."5
Second, the imposition of a duty will advance the economic
well-being of abused children. Children who are abused suffer from
injuries for which they should be compensated. If they are not com-
pensated by someone responsible for allowing the abuse to continue,
then society will end up bearing the costs of their injuries either
through the cost of social programs, or in many cases, by a con-
tinuation of the chain of abuse. These costs may be heavy because of
the longlasting psychological as well as physical scars from abuse.
Third, the use of a reasonable care standard will avoid the
administrative problems of drawing lines between action and inac-
tion and defining the scope of the exceptions to the no-duty rule."
6
Because those lines are drawn in different places under the current
approach," 7 courts can reach inconsistent results, and people are
left unsure about their obligation to help others in distress.
Fourth, justice between the parties suggests that adults who
know about ongoing abuse are in the best position to do something
about it. Children are not in a position to protect themselves, and
consequently, turn to the adults around them for protection. When
those adults ignore child abuse, they have failed in their "natural
responsibilities of social living and human relations," ns and there-
fore, they should be required to compensate children for their failure
to act. Their liability will send out the message to others tempted to
ignore abuse that such behavior will not be tolerated.
115. See Bohlen, supra note 11, at 232 ("[T]he duty of care is predicated upon the
ability of the one to afford protection and the helpless inability of the other to protect
himself; and [the latter's] consequent necessary dependence and reliance upon his associ-
ates' care."). See also Janel Clarke, One Phone Call Breaks a Cycle of Silence, CHI. TRIB.,
July 25, 1993, § 6, at 8 (describing author's need to report child abuse that she observed).
But see Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Mich. 1976) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting)
("No authority is cited for this proposition [to establish a duty of care] other than the
public policy observation that the interest of society would be benefitted if its members
were required to assist one another.").
116. See supra part II.
117. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Juxtaposing statements made by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan illustrates
the justices' varying placement of these lines. The Chief Justice noted: "[tihe harm was
inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua's father. The most that can be said
of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did nothing when suspi-
cious circumstances dictated a more active role for them." Id. at 203. Justice Brennan,
conversely, emphasized that he "would begin from the opposite direction. [He] would
focus first on the action that Wisconsin has taken with respect to Joshua and children
like him, rather than on the actions that the State failed to take. Such a method is not
new to [the Supreme] Court." Id. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The former approach
effectively exculpates the state because it views the abuser as the sole wrongdoer; the
latter approach recognizes that often there is more than one blameworthy party.
118. Wytupeck, 136 A.2d at 893.
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Finally, the imposition of a duty of care would fulfill the goal of
"molding of law in response to the needs of the environment"1 9 by
targeting a national problem: the underreporting of child abuse. 2 '
B. A Model Approach: Lombardo v. Hoag 2'
One court, relying on some of these policies, concluded in a
drunk driving case that the no-duty-to-rescue standard should be
replaced with a duty of reasonable care. The court's opinion in that
case serves as a model for establishing a duty of care in failure to
protect from child abuse cases. Extending the logic of that case, if
individuals have an affirmative duty to protect the general public
from a drunk driver, then certainly adults have a responsibility to
protect children they know from an equally dangerous force: the per-
son who would abuse them.
In Lombardo v. Hoag, a New Jersey court allowed a third party,
who was severely injured in an accident caused by the drunk driving
of a car owner, to bring a negligence cause of action against a defen-
dant who was not the car owner.122 The defendant, a friend of the car
owner, had driven himself, the owner and another passenger home
after an outing because he thought that the owner was too drunk to
119. Green, supra note 112, at 45; see also Wytupeck, 136 A.2d at 894 ("'Duty' is not
a rigid formalism according to the standards of a simpler society, immune to the equally
compelling needs of the present order; duty must of necessity adjust to the changing
social relations and exigencies and man's relation to his fellows. .... ").
120. See infra text accompanying notes 209-11 for a discussion of the impact of
underreporting on establishing cause in fact in a negligence case.
121. Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), rev'd, 634
A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). Although the ruling of the trial judge with
respect to creating a broad duty of care was reversed, the appellate court allowed the
negligence claims against the defendant to stand. 634 A.2d at 559. The value of Lombardo
is not in its weight, but in its wisdom. The reversal was addressed to correct the potential
broad reading of the trial judge's ruling with regards to "duty." Id. ("[Aln over-broad duty
would open a Pandora's Box of potential liability and responsibility problems."). However,
the policy reasons for creating such a duty in a more narrowly-tailored fashion would still
apply.
Moreover, the Lombardo court is not the only court to reject the no-duty rule and ex-
ceptions and create a duty of care based on policy considerations. See, e.g., Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (abandoning the distinctions among trespassers,
licensees and invitees and adopting the reasonable person standard to determine if the
defendant was negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff of a defective faucet handle);
Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 315-17 (Ct. App. 1983) (ignoring the common-
law exceptions to the no-duty rule and imposing an affirmative duty of care based on
public policy on a bartender who refused to allow an individual to telephone the police for
someone in trouble and refused to telephone the police himself); see also Adler, supra note
15, at 870 (recommending that the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction be abandoned
and replaced with a duty arising from policy considerations to act reasonably under the
circumstances).
122. 566 A.2d at 1185, 1190.
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drive. After the defendant arrived home safely, the defendant re-
turned the keys to the car owner and allowed him to drive away.
When the car owner caused an accident that injured the plaintiff,
the plaintiff was allowed to sue the nonowner defendant (among
others) in negligence.
The court examined the defendant's conduct and determined
that he could not be held liable under either state statutes or any of
the exceptions to the no-duty rule." 4 However, the court's analysis
did not end there.'25 Instead, the Lombardo court found that the
defendant could be held liable under general negligence
principles. 26 In reaching that conclusion, the court examined the
policies that gave rise to the defendant's aff=iative duty of care to
the accident victim and concluded that the duty was created by a
combination of public policy, morality and fairness considerations.'27
The court first cited case law and statutes that reflected the
state's strong public policy against drunk driving. 28 The court noted
the state's commitment to curb drunk driving as expressed in deci-
sions such as Kelly v. Gwinnell 29 In that case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court imposed liability on a social host for injuries to a
third party after the host served drinks to a visibly intoxicated guest
123. Id. at 1190.
124. Id. at 1187-88.
125. Other courts, however, have declined to impose liability under almost identical
circumstances. See McGee v. Chalfant, 806 P.2d 980, 985 (Kn. 1991). In McGee, the
Supreme Court of Kansas considered the duty of friends who dropped their friend off at
his car knowing that he was drunk, to the plaintiff who was injured by the friend's drunk
driving. Id. at 982. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the defendants had
taken control of their friend by taking him to his car and allowing him to drive drunk. Id.
at 985. The court concluded that because the defendants did not undertake a duty to pre-
vent him from driving drunk, they could not be held liable for the subsequent accident.
Id. at 986.
126. Lombardo, 566 A.2d at 1189-90. As indicated supra note 121, this portion of the
trial court's opinion was upheld. 634 A.2d at 559.
127. Lombardo, 566 A.2d at 1188-89. In one New Jersey decision that discussed
Lombardo, the court declined to impose an affirmative duty on a driver who failed to
make sure that his passenger had fastened her seatbelt. Poole v. Janeski, 611 A-2d 169,
171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992). The court distinguished the two cases by noting that
public concern about the state's seatbelt policy does not rise to the same level as concern
about its drunk driving policy. Id. The court noted that the language and policy of the
seat-belt statute do not place responsibility on drivers to ensure that their adult passen-
gers use their seatbelts. Id. The court concluded, however, by observing that it might be
willing to recognize the kind of affirmative duty imposed in Lombardo if presented with
another case: "A situation could conceivably arise where public policy, fairness and
morality combine so as to justify imposing this type of duty, but such circumstances are
not found in this case." Id.
128. Lombardo, 566 A.2d at 1188.
129. Id. (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984)).
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and then allowed the guest to drive.130 The no-duty approach did not
serve the policy goal expressed in Kelly: the elimination of drunk
driving.'3 1 Public policy would be better served if courts imposed a
duty to use reasonable care on those best able to prevent drunk
driving.
Similarly, the current no-duty approach would not serve the
public policy goal of curbing child abuse. Public policy considerations
equal to those that underlie the Kelly and Lombardo decisions sup-
port the creation of a duty for failing to prevent child abuse. Manda-
tory reporting laws and other child abuse legislation demonstrate
the desire to stop abuse. 32 The imposition of tort liability on adults
who fail to protect children from abuse would further strengthen
that commitment. The public policy rationale for imposing a duty in
child abuse cases is more compelling than in drunk driving situ-
ations in at least one respect. The duty to take preventive action was
imposed before the injury occurred in Lombardo, but the duty to
prevent harm in child abuse cases would most likely arise after an
incident of abuse because it would be predicated on an individual's
knowledge. In Lombardo, the defendant owed a duty to prevent his
friend from driving because of the risk that a drunk driver presents
to himself and others. Although the car owner did injure someone,
the duty to take affirmative action was imposed before the injury be-
came a reality. In child abuse cases, the duty likewise would be im-
posed because of the risk that a third party presents to a child. The
duty, however, arises after an incident of abuse has occurred, in the
hope of preventing future incidents and injuries. The imposition of a
duty is more justifiable in child abuse cases specifically because the
history of abuse is persuasive indicia that future injury is likely to
occur. Thus, the higher degree of likelihood of injury in child abuse
cases strengthens the public policy argument for imposing a duty of
care.
The Lombardo court also discussed morality and fairness ar-
guments that favored imposing a duty of care on the defendant to
prevent drunk driving. 33 The court criticized the existing law for
130. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
131. Id. at 1222.
132. This legislation, however, may not extend to a situation where, for example, the
state fails to warn parents that their child is at risk of being abused. Owens v. Garfield,
784 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1989). In Owens, the Supreme Court of Utah declined to im-
pose liability on the state for failing to warn parents of child abuse allegations against
their babysitter on either common-law or statutory grounds. Id. at 1189-91. The court
concluded that the state did not have either a special relationship with the babysitter that
would create a duty to control her conduct or a special relationship with the abused child
that would create a duty to protect the child. Moreover, the child who was abused did not
fall within the class of people protected under the state child abuse statute. Id. at 1191.
133. Lombardo, 566 A.2d at 1189-90.
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ignoring the moral implications of a case:
The difference [between the thinking of a lawyer and a layperson] is that
the lay person perceives law as a reflection of morality, and therefore,
concludes that a breach of morality is a breach of the law. The lawyer,
however, thinks of the law in a different fashion. He thinks in terms of
categories, established by legislative enactments and court opinions. He
separates the law from morality .... 13
The court further lamented the lack of morality in the law,
citing the famous example of the absence of a duty to rescue a
drowning person.135 The court concluded that the current no-duty
rule was simply unacceptable in allowing a person to stand by while
another is injured.' 5 For the Lombardo court, the law must
represent what laypeople, not lawyers, want; it noted that the public
"demands that a person exercise a duty of care towards another
person in order to insure that the other person remains free from
harm."3 7 The drowning person example underscores the dominant
value behind the existing no-duty rule: individual autonomy. This
value, however, is not absolute. 38 Lombardo suggests that morality
and fairness may require that this value give way to a duty to help
those in need.3 9
These same morality and fairness principles dictate that a duty
should be imposed on adults who know about ongoing child abuse to
make reasonable efforts to prevent the abuse. The need to stop child
abuse overwhelms considerations about individual autonomy. Like
the defendants in Lombardo, people who know or should know of a
serious public problem-drunk driving or child abuse-and are in a
position to try to prevent the problem should not avoid liability by
claiming that they have a right not to get involved. These people in-
stead have a responsibility to intervene in a way that is aimed to
protect the abused child and prevent further abuse.
134. Id.
135. Id; see also KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 56, at 375 (discussing the drowning
man hypothetical).
136. Lombardo, 566 A.2d at 1189.
137. Id.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 175-81 for a discussion of balancing the
interests under the Learned Hand test. See also supra text accompanying notes 20-37 for
a discussion of the various exceptions to the no-duty rule.
139. Lombardo, 566 A.2d at 1189. Commentators have suggested that this care-
taking value may be rooted in various traditions. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 1, 30-36 (1988) (suggesting the imposition
of a duty to rescue based on a feminist ethic of care and interconnection); Randy Lee, A
Look at God, Feminism and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 371, 386-407 (1992) (responding
to Professor Bender and suggesting that an affirmative duty to rescue may be premised
on Judeo-Christian philosophy).
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C. A Criminal Law Analogy
The recognition of tort liability in cases where a person fails to
intervene to prevent ongoing child abuse would reflect a parallel
trend in criminal law. Several courts have imposed criminal liability
on a parent who failed to protect his or her child from the other
parent's abuse.140 In these cases the courts have held criminally
responsible a parent who neither lifted a hand to hurt nor to help
the child. Relying on state criminal laws, the courts determined that
their state's legislature intended to treat a parent's failure to act in
the same way that it would punish the affirmative act of abuse.1
4 1
Although the courts have not yet extended such criminal liability to
people other than parents, the courts and legislatures have sent a
strong message to parents about their responsibility toward their
children.142 If parents do not take action to prevent abuse, they may
face criminal liability.
4 3
By holding parents who fail to protect their children criminally
liable, a state signals its commitment to curbing child abuse.
Imposing tort liability on adults who fail to use reasonable care to
prevent abuse in the home would similarly discourage abuse. The
imposition of tort liability would be a public acknowledgment that
the adult was awrongdoer when she failed to intervene in the child's
140. See Michael v. Alaska, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (upholding father's
second-degree assault conviction for failing to prevent his wife's abuse of their child); Illi-
nois v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (Il1. 1992) (upholding defendant's murder conviction be-
cause of her failure to protect her children from the murderer); North Carolina v. Walden,
293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982) (upholding a mother's conviction for aiding and abetting an
assault with a deadly weapon by another person on her child); Rhode Island v. Cacchiotti,
568 A.2d 1026 (R.I. 1990) (upholding a mother's conviction for involuntary manslaughter
when she failed to seek medical attention for her son after he was severely beaten by her
boyfriend); Wisconsin v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (upholding mother's
conviction for child abuse because she left her children with their father who she knew
was physically and sexually abusing them).
141. See, e.g., Michael, 767 P.2d at 199. "It seems clear under the law that where the
parent fails to carry out this duty and and the child is injured as a result, the parent has
caused the child's injuries and may be held criminally liable." Id.
142. See Pope v. Maryland, 396 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1979) (reversing the child abuse
conviction of a family friend who did not intervene while a mother beat her child to death
in the friend's home).
143. See Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 LAW
& INEQ. J. 359, 375-87 (1987) (discussing the rationale behind imposing criminal liability
for parents' failure to protect their children from abuse); Nancy A. Tanck, Note,
Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect Their
Children From Abuse, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 659, 684-86 (criticizing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision to impose liability on a mother who failed to protect her children from
their father's abuse in Wisconsin v. Williquette). Because criminal liability is traditionally
considered more severe than civil liability, courts willing to find such criminal liability
may also be willing to uphold a private action. Moreover, a private action probably would
lie against the parent. See Collier, supra note 2, at 192.
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abuse. Such recognition of the defendant's wrongful conduct would
encourage this defendant and others to modify their future behavior
by taking steps to prevent abuse. Thus, tort liability would deter
future inaction and help to prevent future abuse.
In addition, the scope of tort liability can be broader than the
scope of criminal liability because the nature of the liability dif-
fers.144 Thus, adults other than the child's parents can be liable for
failing to use reasonable care to prevent abuse. Criminal law aims to
punish the wrongdoer, and tort law seeks to compensate the injured
party.145 It may be problematic to incarcerate a non-parent for failing
to protect a child from parental abuse because that person never had
legal responsibility for the child. However, that person can be ex-
pected to acknowledge his role facilitating in the child's injury and
to compensate the injured child under tort principles. Therefore, the
recognition of a duty of care for adults would complement existing
criminal law and fulfill two goals of tort law. First, recognition of a
duty of care will discourage household members from ignoring abuse
in their homes, and second, tort liability would provide a remedy to
an abused child.
IV. DEFINING THE CAUSE OF AcTION: Two SCENARIOS
The shortcomings of the no-duty rule and exceptions in the
context of child abuse cases, coupled with the policy reasons under-
lying the imposition of a duty of care on people who do nothing in
the face of known child abuse, support the need. for a common-law
negligence approach to these cases. Once that need has been esta-
blished, the intricacies of a negligence cause of action for failing to
protect children from abuse must be explored. This section presents
two scenarios to address the specific, subtle issues that might arise
when a negligence claim is brought against individuals who know of
ongoing child abuse but do nothing to stop it. The first case consi-
ders liability for a parent's failure to protect her child from abuse,
and the second examines the liability of a non-family member for
failing to protect a child from abuse.
A. The Case of the Negligent Parent
Vicki Jones and Darren Smith, both age nineteen, have been
living together for six months. 46 After the couple had been dating for
144. See Collier, supra note 2, at 192 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of imposing civil and criminal liability for failure to report child abuse).
145. KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 2, at 7.
146. Although this hypothetical is not based on one case, it represents a common
pattern in child abuse cases: a child abused by his mother's boyfriend. One national sur-
vey estimates that the boyfriend or girlfriend of a parent is responsible in one out of four
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three months, Darren moved into the five-room apartment that
Vicki shares with her eighteen-month-old son, Jeff. Darren is not
Jeff's father; Jeff's father has no contact with Vicki nor with his son.
Since he moved in, Darren, who works at night, has watched Jeff in
the afternoons while Vicki has attended a computer programming
class. Vicki does not work. The transition from dating to living to-
gether has not been completely smooth. Darren has become increa-
singly moody and withdrawn from Vicki. Sometimes he can be
charming and outgoing, but often he is sullen, especially when Jeff
demands a lot of his mother's time. Vicki has noticed that Jeff
sometimes has large bruises on his legs, buttocks and back when she
gets home from class. 47 When she asked Darren about the bruises,
he commented that Jeff, an active toddler, hurt himself while
playing. Vicki had observed that Jeff does fall down while playing,
but she had never noticed such bruises when he has been with her.
Vicki believed Darren's explanation and has not pressed the issue
any further because she did not want either to jeopardize their
relationship, which means a great deal to her, or to anger Darren.
One afternoon, Vicki arrived home from work to find a note from
Darren saying that he had to take Jeff to the hospital after a bad
fall. When Vicki reached the hospital, the emergency room doctor
informed her that Jeff had suffered a concussion from a sharp blow
to the head and must remain there overnight. Furthermore, the
doctor also told Vicki that he suspected child abuse and was
reporting Darren to the local department of social services. The
issue is whether Vicki could be liable in tort for failure to protect
Jeff from Darren.
1. Parental Immunity. When the defendant is the child's
parent, the threshold question of parental immunity must be
addressed. Under the doctrine, children could not sue their parents
in tort for injuries caused by parental misconduct.'48 The rule and
child abuse cases where the perpetrator is known. See Flynn McRoberts & John Gorman,
Child Abuse Often Points to Boyfriend, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1993, at Al (citing statistics
from the National Incidence Study by Westat). The national average is reflected in local
statistics. Four months into a year-long series about the murder of children in the Chi-
cago area, The Chicago Tribune observed that five out of the twenty children killed in
1993 were "alleged to have been beaten or shaken to death by their mothers' boyfriends."
Colin McMahon, A Mother's Trust Turns to Tragedy, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1993, at Al.
147. A typical child abuse case often involves a boyfriend or father beating a child
while the child's mother knows about the abuse but does not intervene. McRoberts &
Gorman, supra note 146, at Al.
148. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 122, at 904-09; Gall Hollister,
Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAhi L. REV. 489
(1982) (examining the "historical and social basis of parent-child immunity"); Martin J.
Rooney and Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the
[Vol. 42436
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rationale were set forth in a trio of cases. 49 Three primary reasons
were identified in support of the doctrine of parental immunity: the
need to maintain family harmony;5 ' the need of parents to control
their children;'' and concern about the financial effects of tort
liability on a family.'52 Since the rule was established a century ago,
however, changing attitudes about the importance of each of these
rationales have eroded the rule.
The first concern-that the lawsuit would disrupt family har-
mony-is undercut by consideration of the event that gave rise to
the claim. Recently, courts have begun to recognize that a parent's
tortious conduct would have already disrupted family harmony, and
would continue to disrupt it if the child were not permitted to for-
mally address it by attempting to recover for the injuries caused by
that behavior.'53 Also, the existence of liability insurance shifted the
adversarial relationship away from among family members to be-
tween a family member and the insurance company.15 Furthermore,
the second concern identified-that tort liability would undermine
parental authority-was overstated because parents do not have
total discretion in raising their children.'55
Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161 (1991) (detailing the history of parent-child immunity
in the United States).
149. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891) (denying a child the opportunity to
sue her mother for false imprisonment), overruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 907
(Miss. 1992); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903) (denying a child the right
to sue parents for cruel and inhuman treatment), overruled by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871
S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905) (denying a daughter the
opportunity to seek damages against her father for rape).
150. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887. The court in Hewellette stated:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of soci-
ety, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id.
151. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664 ("At common law the right of the father to the control
and custody of his infant child grow out of the corresponding duty on his part to maintain,
protect, and educate it. These rights could only be forfeited by gross misconduct on his
part.").
152. Roller, 79 P. at 789 (expressing concern that (1) a damage award to one child
might make parents less capable of supporting other minor children in the family; and (2)
if a child died following successful receipt of a damage award against the parent, the
money would, in all likelihood, be returned to the parents as an inheritance).
153. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975).
154. Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (Ariz. 1970).
155. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (balancing Amish parents' right
not to send their children to American public schools against the state's interest in uni-
versal education); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (balancing a parent's
right to bring up the child in a way that she sees fit, a child's right to exercise her
religious beliefs and the state's interests in protecting the welfare of its children); In re
Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (balancing the state's interest in enhancing a child's
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The final concern-the perceived financial burden liability
would create upon the family-should not be a bar to allowing the
child to recover. 156 From the outset, depending upon how one defines
the term "cost," the "cost" of child abuse will be carried by the family
unit initially, especially where the child is not permitted to recover.
Thus, judicial concerns about the burden upon families seem mis-
placed in this context. Moreover, focusing on where the burden
should be placed within the family, it is clear that allowing recovery
is desirable because children will be compensated for their injuries.
The child might further benefit if he is removed from the abusive
home and takes the money with him. In addition, the child's only
compensation for his injuries might come from the person who failed
to protect him from abuse. Most homeowners insurance policies do
not cover the intentional torts of the abuser, but they are are likely
to cover negligent conduct, such as failure to protect from abuse.167
In sum, none of these concerns overrides the need to compen-
sate children who are injured as a result of parents ignoring child
abuse in the home. Child abuse shatters domestic tranquility, does
not represent a reasonable exercise of parental authority, and costs
children (and the family) and society in both the short- and long-
term. Thus, the policies behind parental immunity do not withstand
scrutiny in child abuse cases.
Courts have used two approaches to modify the doctrine of pa-
rental immunity. One early modification only partially abolished the
doctrine. In Goller v. White, 55 the Wisconsin Supreme Court abro-
gated the doctrine of parental immunity but preserved two situ-
ations where parents would be immune: "(1) where the alleged neg-
ligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child;
and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordi-
nary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food,
physical well-being against both the parent's religious beliefs and the child's preferences).
156. The concerns about the financial effects on a family often center around two
issues: (1) liability prompting fraud and collusion among family members, and (2) liability
depleting a family's financial resources. The first concern can be addressed by structuring
an award so that a parent does not have access to it. For example, the money could be put
in a trust account administered by a third party. The second concern is easily resolved be-
cause the increase in the cost of liability insurance will not be great enough to affect fam-
ily finances significantly. See Roller, 79 P. at 789.
157. See Todd J. Gillman, Sex Abuse Suit a Worry for Insurers, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 1, 1992, at A45. But cf Eric T. Lanham, Comment, Suing Parents
in Tort for Child Abuse: A New Role for the Court Appointed Guardian Ad Litem? 61
UMKC L. REV. 101, 114-16 (1992) (discussing the lack of specific insurance coverage for
conduct such as negligent failure to prevent child abuse under most homeowners insur-
ance policies).
158. See Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
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clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care."159 It
is not difficult to see, however, that many situations would lend
themselves to arguments that one of these two exceptions was met.
A more recent approach abolished the doctrine entirely. In Gib-
son v. Gibson,60 the Supreme Court of California concluded that
partial abrogation of parental immunity presented too many oppor-
tunities for arbitrary line drawing about what constituted parental
authority or discretion. The court proposed that parents' conduct
should be evaluated under the "reasonable, prudent parent stan-
dard."16" ' Under this standard, a parent who does not behave as a
reasonable, prudent parent would under similar circumstances face
tort liability for negligence. The determination of reasonableness
under Gibson might take into account the status of the child
involved, 62 the presence or absence of other children in the family
who demand parental attention, and the "economic, social and
physical environment" in which the family lives. 163 Jury members,
drawing from their own experiences, could determine whether a
parent was acting reasonably.
Although either approach could result in liability, the Gibson
reasonable parent standard is preferable to the Goller approach
when the issue is parental failure to protect children from abuse. To
illustrate, it might be difficult for a parent like Vicki to insulate her-
self from liability under the Goller approach; she would have to
demonstrate that her failure to protect her children represented an
exercise of parental authority or discretion. Perhaps such a defen-
dant could argue that a failure to supervise her child or investigate
her suspicions were acts of parental discretion, but she would not be
able to successfully claim that knowing about the abuse and igno-
ring it falls within the scope of parental authority and discretion.
The Goller partial abrogation standard requires courts to consider
the defendant's conduct in each case to determine if parental failure
to protect from abuse is shielded by one of the two exceptions. These
broad exceptions could deprive Jeff and other children of the oppor-
tunity to recover from parents who allowed them to be injured.
The Gibson standard demands that Vicki and other parents
159. Id. at 198.
160. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
161. Id. at 653.
162. The child's status includes "such variable matters as the age, mental and
physical health, intelligence, aptitudes and needs of the child involved...." Anderson v.
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn. 1980).
163. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court had previously adopted the Goller partial
abrogation standard with one change: the alleged negligent act had to involve the exercise
of reasonable parental authority. Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. 1968),
overruled by Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
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conform their conduct to a level of care that is expected of anyone
who undertakes parenting responsibilities. Clearly, this would
include protecting their children from known dangers. Children de-
pend on their parents for protection, and parents are in the best
position to provide that protection. Parents who fail to provide that
protection should not be able to hide behind sweeping assertions of
parental authority or discretion.164 It would indeed be ironic if
parents, who owe a greater duty to their children than do other
adults, were immune from liability while other family and non-
family members might not be afforded such protection. In DeShaney,
the Supreme Court considered imposing liability on a state social
worker for failing to protect a child from his father's abuse. 165 If
courts seriously contemplate extending liability to people who are
not the child's parents and are not even family members, then they
certainly should expect parents to protect their children from
ongoing abuse. In the hypothetical, Vicki's conduct should be judged
against societal norms of parental behavior to ensure that she and
other parents make reasonable efforts to protect their children from
abuse. Therefore, the Gibson approach directs that parents such as
Vicki must not be immune from liability as a result of their status as
parents.
2. Duty and Breach. Whether a parent like Vicki owes her child
a duty of care turns on the question of whether the risk of harm to
the child was something that the parent should "reasonably [have]
perceived." 66 Under the facts in the hypothetical, if Vicki reasonably
should have perceived the risk of leaving her son alone with her boy-
friend, then she owed the child a duty to protect him from that risk.
The determination of the foreseeability of the risk to Vicki de-
pends first on identifying the appropriate standard of care against
which her conduct can be evaluated, and second, assessing the rea-
sonableness of her conduct in light of that standard. Another way of
asking the first question is: "Whose eyes do you look through to
evaluate the defendant's conduct?" 167 Courts usually look through
the eyes of a reasonable, prudent person under the circumstances;
68
164. The opposing argument-that the child is eager to accept all of the benefits
that his parents bestow, but then will not accept the burdens of that relationship-does
not withstand scrutiny when the burden asked of the child is abuse.
165. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191
(1989).
166. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
167. One of my colleagues, Randy Lee, frames the issue this way. See also Palsgraf,
162 N.E. at 100 ("[The orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance
would be the orbit of the duty.").
168. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P. 1837). One commentator
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however, under Gibson, a court would look through the eyes of the
reasonable, prudent parent.169 If a reasonable, prudent parent would
have conducted herself in the way that Vicki did, then Vicki's con-
duct would be deemed reasonable under the circumstances. If, how-
ever, Vicki's failure to intervene fell below the level of care expected
of the reasonable, prudent parent, then her conduct would be
deemed unreasonable, and she would have breached her duty of
care.
It is unclear whether the reasonable, prudent parent standard
requires more or less from a defendant than the reasonable, prudent
person standard.7 ' An argument might be made that it requires less
because it takes into account "such variable matters as... the
economic, social and physical environment in which the conduct
occurs... ."171 Thus, one might argue that given Vicki's youth and
inexperience, she may have been acting like a reasonable, prudent
parent under the circumstances. The argument would emphasize
that Vicki should not be held liable if she were not at fault, and that
she was not at fault because she did not have the ability to prevent
the abuse. 172 She is a teen-aged, single parent struggling to raise a
child under adverse conditions. The conclusion to this line of argu-
ment is that Vicki's status does not require as much of her as it
would the reasonable, prudent person under the circumstances.
However, although it is makes sense to look at who Vicki is
when determining what standard of care she should be held to, this
does not mean that the law cannot set a minimal standard of care
wrote: "It is frequently said that if the defendant as an ordinarily prudent person foresaw
or should have foreseen some harm to the victim or other person so situated, defendant
was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid such harm." Green, supra note 112,
at 45.
169. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) ("The standard to be applied is
the traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed in light of the parental role. Thus, we
think the proper test of a parent's conduct is this: What would an ordinarily reasonable
and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?"). See supra text accompanying
notes 160-63 for additional discussion of the reasonable, prudent parent standard.
170. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W. 595, 598-99 (Minn. 1980) (discussing
the level of care required under the reasonable parent standard).
171. Id. at 599.
172. Vicki's inability to protect Jeff would be further exacerbated if Darren had been
abusing Vicki as well. If she had been battered, then she may have been unable physically
as well as psychologically to prevent the abuse from occurring. The psychological reasons
that she might not be able to break the cycle of violence are complex and interrelated:
fear of Darren (especially that he might retaliate against Jeff), financial and emotional
dependence on him, isolation from others, an inability to recognize an abusive situation
because of her background, and the lack of a safe, alternative place to go. See LENORE
WALKER, THE BA2rERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1987) (describing the three-phase cycle in
the battering relationship); Johnson, supra note 143, at 377-81 (discussing the dynamics
of family violence).
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expected of her. That standard could be elevated based on the cir-
cumstances. For example, it might be appropriate to expect more of
Vicki if she were a child psychologist who had a professional under-
standing of the dangers of child abuse, or a more mature parent with
a better support network. In those cases, the parent, by virtue of
education or experience, would be better able than Vicki to identify
and act on the problem. When looking at "who Vicki is," however, we
must be careful not to stereotype her based on the label "young,
single mother," nor should we excuse her conduct for that reason. It
would be patronizing as well as counter-productive to assume that a
parent such as Vicki can meet only a substandard level of care be-
cause of her status. Therefore, while a parent might be held to a
higher standard if circumstances so indicate, that parent should
never be permitted to do less than the reasonable, prudent person.
Having established that Vicki's conduct should be evaluated by
looking through the eyes of the reasonable, prudent parent, a court
assessing her conduct is likely to conclude that it was unreasonable
under the circumstances. In determining that Vicki's conduct fell
below the standard of care of a reasonable, prudent parent, and thus
was unreasonable, a court will consider the connection or relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant, and the defendant's actions in
light of that relationship. Courts have observed that a sufficient
connection between plaintiff and defendant must exist such that the
plaintiff is in the defendant's "range of apprehension,"73 or group of
people to whom the defendant owes a duty of care. For example, in
Lombardo v. Hoag, the court delineated the defendant's range of ap-
prehension broadly to include members of the general public-
strangers to the defendant.' 74 In this case, the connection between
the plaintiff and the defendant is much closer than it was in Lom-
bardo; here they are mother and son. As his mother, Vicki owed Jeff
a duty to ensure that he remained free from harm because he was
subject to her care. Children depend on their parents for care, and
parents are in the best position to protect their children from harm.
Vicki should be held legally responsible for her failure to keep Jeff
safe from harm.
Once this relationship has been established, a court can begin
to evaluate the reasonableness of Vicki's conduct. Over the years,
courts have developed various tests to determine reasonableness.
One such test was presented in United States v. Carroll Towing.175
In that case, Judge Learned Hand proposed a test to evaluate the
173. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
174. Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1186-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989),
rev'd, 634 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). See supra part III.B.
175. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. His test, which takes the
form of a mathematical formula, balances the interests of the defen-
dant against those of the plaintiff.176 Under his test, the "burden of
adequate precautions," or cost to the defendant of eliminating the
risk, comprises one side of the equation. 177 The other side of the
equation consists of the probability that the injury will occur mul-
tiplied by the severity of that injury if it does occur.178 If the burden
of adequate precautions is greater than the probability and severity
of the injury, then the defendant's conduct was reasonable. A defen-
dant's conduct is unreasonable if the probability and severity of the
injury outweigh the cost to him of eliminating the risk.
The cost to a defendant of eliminating the risk of harm, or "the
burden of adequate precautions," 79 depends on two factors: the
defendant's knowledge of the risk, and the action required to
eliminate the risk.' A defendant's knowledge would be measured
by the reasonableness standard-whether the defendant knew or
should have known of the ongoing abuse.'
8
'
Given the signs of abuse in the household, the burden on Vicki
to recognize the danger to Jeff was low. 18' Although no one directly
176. The same analysis could be done using a test from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 291-93. The Restatement test also measures
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct by weighing its risks against its utility. Id.
The only difference between the Hand and Restatement tests is that the Restatement'test
focuses on the effect of the conduct on society rather than on the individuals involved.
The same result would be reached in this case if the Restatement test were used: society
has such a strong interest in preventing child abuse that the defendant's conduct would
be considered unreasonable and the risk of harm foreseeable.
177. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
178. Judge Hand explained this test: "[L]iability depends on whether B [the burden
of adequate precautions] is less than L [the potential injury] multiplied by P [the
probability of injury]; i.e., whether B < PL." Id.
179. Id.
180. See generally Delair v. McAdoo, 188 A. 181 (Pa. 1936).
181. See Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989)
("The bottom line is that if defendant Niemeyer knew or should have known that defen-
dant Hoag was intoxicated and unable to drive, then he should have done whatever a rea-
sonable person would have done under the circumstances. . . . "), rev'd, 634 A.2d 550
(1993).
182. Although Vicki was not present when the beatings took place, she need not
witness the abuse to be aware of it. Courts in two recent cases determined that mothers
knew about ongoing abuse in the home even though neither mother actually observed the
abuse. Richie v. Richie, No. 91-03635 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 1992); Elliott v. Dickerson, No. 91-
1524-B (D. Tex. Oct. 17, 1992). In both cases, girls who had been sexually abused by their
father or stepfather in their homes successfully sued their mothers for negligently failing
to protect them from abuse. In Richie, a jury awarded the daughter $1.4 million compen-
satory damages against the parents. Richie, No. 91-03635, slip op. at 2. In Elliott, the jury
awarded the two daughters $1.7 million against the mother. Elliott, No. 91-1524-B, slip
op. at 3. In these cases, as in Vicki's, the mothers did not have to be present while the
abuse took place to know that her child was at risk. The mothers in Richie v. Richie and
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informed Vicki that Darren was abusing Jeff, she saw the aftermath
of that abuse-bruises and marks on Jeff-and she was concerned
enough to ask Darren about what was going on. Under these facts,
Vicki knew or should have known of the abuse. Furthermore, Vicki
was in the best position to learn about the ongoing abuse in the
home. Vicki lived with the abuser, Darren, and the abused, Jeff, and
she saw signs of abuse. Yet, she unquestioningly accepted the ex-
planations of Darren, whom she had known for less than one year,
about the origin of Jeff's bruises. Society wants to encourage those
who have access to information about child abuse to seek out that in-
formation. When people like Vicki have access to this information
but do not use it, they should be held responsible for the conse-
quences of that choice. Having established that the knowledge part
of the burden would be met in the hypothetical, the next step is to
evaluate the burden to Vicki of eliminating the risk of harm to her
child.
The burden on Vicki to take precautions to eliminate the risk
was low; she need only have taken minimal steps to protect Jeff. In
Lombardo, the court stated "that if the defendant Niemeyer knew or
should have known that Hoag [the car owner] was intoxicated and
unable to drive, then he should have done whatever a reasonable
person would have done under the circumstances to see that Hoag
did not drive his vehicle."'83 The court found that any of the
following would have been reasonable conduct: dropping Hoag off at
Elliot v. Dickerson claimed that they did not know about the abuse. See Gillman, supra
note 157, at A45; In Richie, the father who was molesting his daughter removed all of the
bedroom and bathroom doors. The complaint against the mother alleged that she saw her
husband coming out of their daughter's room late at night several times and that rela-
tives had repeatedly warned her about her husband's conduct. Tim Nelson, Woman
Awarded $2.4 Million From Dad, Mom, For Sex Abuse, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 3,
1992, at Al. The daughter estimated that her father had molested her at least 250 times
during a six-year period. Id. In Elliott, the two daughters testified that their stepfather
molested them over a five-year period that began when they were six and eight years old.
They claimed that they told their mother that their stepfather was molesting them and
that she confronted him once about his conduct. Mary Hull, Mother Held Liable for Step-
father's Sexual Abuse, TEX. LAW., Oct. 26, 1992, at 10. When he denied the allegations,
the mother told her daughters to "resist [his] advances if he tried it again." Id. The
mother continued to leave her daughters home alone with him, and the abuse continued.
Courts in cases like Richie and Elliott could easily find that the defendants knew or
should have known about the abuse. The mothers had been told of their husbands' con-
duct in both cases; in one case the mother acknowledged the information by confronting
her husband and giving advice to her daughters about how to avoid the abuse. Even if the
mothers maintained that they did not actually know of the abuse because they had not
witnessed it, a court could determine that they should have known of the abuse had they
chosen not to deny the evidence that confronted them.
183. Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), rev'd,
634 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
444 [Vol. 42
BREAKING THE SILENCE
his home and returning his car the next day; driving Hoag home in
another car; telephoning Hoag's family for assistance; or trying to
persuade Hoag not to drive.M The defendant was not obligated to
take extraordinary measures, simply reasonable ones. In any event,
he did nothing.
As a reasonably prudent parent, Vicki should have inquired
further into Darren's behavior herself or contacted the appropriate
state agency to investigate. These simple, precautionary measures
would not have demanded much of Vicki and can be expected of rea-
sonable, prudent parents. Vicki's failure to take steps to prevent the
abuse constituted unreasonable conduct, and therefore, she
breached her duty of care to Jeff.1' In addition, Vicki could have
taken other effective measures such as not leaving Jeff alone with
Darren, removing Darren from the home, or severing all contact
with Darren if he persisted as a threat to Jeff. A defendant in Vicki's
position may try to argue that the financial and emotional costs of
these measures outweigh the probability multiplied by the severity
of the injury. For example, the financial costs might be prohibitive if
Vicki could not afford a babysitter for Jeff every time that she went
out and could not take him with her everywhere she went. The emo-
tional costs of upsetting her relationship might be great if Vicki
refused to leave Jeff alone with Darren, asked Darren to move out,
or tried to end their relationship. All of these steps would risk
angering Darren; Darren's anger at the situation could turn into
violence toward Vicki and Jeff.186 Furthermore, Vicki's emotional
attachment to Darren would make it more difficult to sever the ties.
Thus, a defendant in Vicki's position might maintain that she could
not take these additional steps to protect Jeff because the burden of
adequate precautions would be prohibitively high. These excuses,
however, crumble in the face of child abuse. Neither the financial
burden nor the emotional price that a defendant like Vicki must
allegedly bear to eliminate the risk of harm outweighs the
probability of injury to her child multiplied by the likely severity of
the injury.
The burden of adequate precaution must be weighed against
the likelihood of injury occurring and the seriousness of that injury.
The probability of the abuse continuing if Vicki does nothing is
measured by the existence of "some real likelihood of some damage
and the likelihood is of such appreciable weight and moment as to
184. Id.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 160-63 for further discussion of the rea-
sonable, prudent parent standard.
186. If Darren were abusing Vicki as well, the validity of this argument would be
clearer. See supra note 172.
4451994]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
induce, or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on the
part of a person with a reasonably prudent mind."8 1 Using this
standard, a plaintiff would argue that the likelihood of injury stan-
dard is more than satisfied in a case such as the hypothetical: the
injury has occurred, has become a reality, and will continue to occur
if the defendant's conduct remains unchecked. The likelihood is of
appreciable weight because of the cyclical nature of child abuse and
the amount of evidence of that abuse. The likelihood is of appre-
ciable moment because the chance of injury is imminent and
ongoing. In the hypothetical, Vicki noticed bruises on Jeff, suspected
that her boyfriend was abusing her son, and still failed to act. Vicki
increased the risk of serious harm to Jeff every day she silently
stood by while the abuse continued. By her failure to act, she
virtually guaranteed that Jeff would continue to be beaten and
would suffer injuries. Thus, in these cases, a defendant's failure to
act gives rise to a probability that the child will continue to be
abused and injured.
A victim such as Jeff in the hypothetical would suffer from both
emotional and physical injuries. The physical injuries are evident in
the bruises and broken rib that Jeff sustained. The emotional inju-
ries that he has suffered may manifest themselves immediately or
later.188 His emotional injuries may take the form of depression,
humiliation, anger, and anxiety.18 9 All are reactions common to
individuals who are abused as children. 19° Although the emotional
injuries are not necessarily as quantifiable as the physical injuries,
the emotional injuries can be more severe and longer-lasting. Thus,
the potential for severity is great. When these factors are placed into
the Learned Hand formula articulated in Carroll Towing, the proba-
bility of injury multiplied by the severity of that injury which would
result from Vicki's failure to protect Jeff from abuse outweighs the
burden on Vicki to take adequate precautions to eliminate the risk.
Thus, Vicki's conduct would be deemed unreasonable, and she would
be considered to have breached the duty of care that she owed to her
child.
3. Causation. Once the duty and breach of that duty have been
established, a plaintiff must establish causation in a negligence
187. GulfRefiningv. Williams, 185 So. 234, 236 (Miss. 1938).
188. For example, the jury in one recent case awarded a young woman who had
been molested by her father damages for past and future emotional distress and for past
and future mental health therapy. Richie v. Richie, No. 91-03635, slip op. at 2 (D. Minn.
Oct. 5, 1992). See also supra note 182.
189. See generally DAVID A. WOLFE, THE EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
ISSUES AND RESEARCH (1991).
190. Id.
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claim.191 The plaintiff must establish that the defendant was both
the cause in fact and the proximate or legal cause of his injuries. In
a failure to protect from abuse case, the plaintiff may experience
some difficulty in establishing cause in fact. Courts have at their
disposal a number of tests to determine causation in any particular
case. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine under these various
tests whether causation would be established under the facts of the
hypothetical above.
The question of whether Vicki's conduct is a cause in fact of
Darren's continued abuse of Jeff is intertwined with the nature of
the duty that she owes to Jeff. A court will turn initially to the "but
for" test to determine whether Vicki's conduct is a cause in fact of
the abuse. 192 Using the "but for" test, the plaintiff has to establish
that the event would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's
negligent conduct. 93 Stated another way, the defendant's conduct is
not a cause in fact of the event if the event would have taken place
anyway. 94 Therefore, in a failure to protect from abuse case, the
plaintiff must prove that the abuse would not have continued to oc-
cur "but for" the defendant's negligent conduct.
The definition of Vicki's negligent conduct is essential to de-
termining whether the "but for" test has been satisfied. The more
that is required of Vicki for her conduct to be negligent, the easier it
is to establish "but for" causation. For example, if Vicki were re-
quired to take extreme measures, such as leaving town with Jeff to
escape from Jeff's abuse, and she did not do so, then her failure to
flee would be a "but for" cause of any further abuse of Jeff. Of course,
however, no court would require Vicki to take such extreme
measures. As noted in the above discussion of the Learned Hand
test, Vicki is only required to take reasonable action, not extreme
measures, to prevent further abuse to Jeff.95 Although in our
scenario, "but for" causation could be easily established, a court
would find that the burden on Vicki to eliminate the risk would be
far too great, and thus, she would not have a duty to take such
extreme steps.
191. I am grateful to my colleague Randy Lee for his insights about this section.
192. Cause in fact can be established by a defendant's inaction as well as his action.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 41, at 265 ("The conception of causation in fact ex-
tends not only to positive acts and active physical forces, but also to pre-existing passive
conditions which played a material part in bringing about the event. In particular, it ap-
plies to the defendant's omissions as well as his acts."); see also David A. Fischer, Causa-
tion in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1992) (discussing "the
particular problems that arise in applying causation principles in omissions cases.").
193. See KEETONETAL., supra note 11, § 41 at 266.
194. Id.
195. In other words, courts will not require a defendant to take extreme measures,
although those measures might be better calculated to prevent harm to the plaintiff.
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Conversely, if Vicki's duty demands that she take reasonable
precautions to eliminate the risk and she does not do so, then she
may satisfy the duty and breach elements in a negligence cause of
action, but may not meet the requirements of the "but for" cause in
fact test. For example, Vicki's reporting the abuse to child welfare
officials could be considered taking reasonable precautions to pre-
vent the abuse, and her failure to notify them of Darren's abuse of
Jeff represented a breach of that duty. As DeShaney indicates, how-
ever, Vicki's failure to report the beatings might not operate as a
"but for" cause of the abuse because the involvement of a state
agency does not always guarantee protection of the child.19 The
facts of DeShaney demonstrate that reporting Randy DeShaney's
abuse of his son, Joshua, to child welfare authorities did not prevent
further abuse, and may even have made the beatings worse. 1 7
Joshua's stepmother, family friends, and medical personnel reported
Randy's ongoing abuse to child welfare officials several times.19 Yet,
while child welfare officials supposedly were monitoring the situ-
ation, Randy's beatings of Joshua grew more severe until Joshua
sustained permanent, serious brain damage.'99 The lesson of De-
Shaney for Jeff and other abused children is that "reasonable pre-
cautions" do not necessarily stop the abuse and protect the child; in
fact, interventions may jeopardize the child's safety even further.
Thus, failure to intervene by reporting the abuse is not a "but for"
cause of the abuse.
The difficulty then in imposing tort liability under the "but for"
cause standard for failing to protect a child from ongoing abuse is
establishing duty and cause in fact together. Using that approach,
the cost to the defendant of eliminating the risk, and thus the duty,
may be too high to satisfy the "but for" test. When the duty is
lowered to require the defendant to take reasonable precautions to
eliminate the risk, the "but for" test may not be met. Therefore,
courts should consider alternative cause-in-fact tests in developing
this cause of action.
One such test is set forth in Reynolds v. Tex. & Pac. Ry.209
Under the Reynolds two-part approach, courts must consider first
whether the defendant's negligence greatly multiplies the chances of
an accident to the plaintiff, and second, whether the negligence is of
196. Not only does such reporting not guarantee an end to the abuse-tragically, in
situations where the abuser is aware that he is under suspicion, the beatings may
increase in frequency or severity.
197. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93
(1989).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 193.
200. 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885).
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a character naturally leading to the occurrence of an accident.2°1
In Reynolds, the court determined that a defendant's negli-
gence in failing to light a stairway and provide a handrail signifi-
cantly increased the chance that someone would fall down those
stairs and injure himself.2 2 The court allowed the plaintiff to recover
damages from the defendant railway company for injuries she sus-
tained when she fell down the stairs.0 3 The burden on the defendant
railroad company to install a handrail and lights was minimal, and
the failure to take these precautions significantly increased the
chances that someone would fall down the stairs.
Under the Reynolds approach, the determination of whether
Vicki's conduct greatly multiplies the chances of the abuse of Jeff
depends on whether her failure to intervene significantly increased
the possibility of injury to him.0 4 Vicki could have tried to protect
Jeff by limiting his contact with Darren or by removing Darren from
the home.20 5 It may be impossible to limit contact among people who
live together as a family-especially when they live in close quarters.
Vicki, Jeff and Darren lived in a five-room apartment, so Vicki could
not keep her son and boyfriend apart. It might, however, have been
possible to prevent Darren from being alone with Jeff. Of course,
this would require planning and expense on Vicki's part, but if the
alternative jeopardizes the safety of her child, then her choice
should be clear. Although removing Darren from the home or
moving out of the home herself would impose a high cost on Vicki,
those measures might protect her son and herself from harm. If
those precautions are reasonable and Vicki does not take them, then
she has greatly multiplied the chances of further abuse.20 ' Her
failure to limit Darren's contact with Jeff or remove Darren from the
home could significantly increase the possibility of abuse by giving
Darren more opportunities to beat Jeff.
201. Id. at 698. On the issue of probability, the Reynolds court proclaimed:
[Wihere the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of acci-
dent to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the
mere possibility that [the accident] might have happened without the negligence
is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between the negligence
and the injury.
Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 696-98.
204. Id. at 698.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
206. Vicki's failure to meet the minimal burden of warning the authorities about the
ongoing abuse, however, might not significantly increase the chances that the abuse
would continue. As DeShaney demonstrates, Vicki's reporting the abuse of Jeff to the
child welfare department might have done nothing to stop, and could have worsened, the
abuse.
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Under Reynolds, Vicki's conduct must also be "of a character
naturally leading to [the] occurrence [of the abuse]."207 Jeff must
demonstrate that Vicki's failure to act ordinarily results in contin-
uing abuse. Jeff should not have a hard time meeting this part of the
Reynolds test, even if Vicki's negligent conduct is defined as failing
to report the abuse to the appropriate authorities. Courts and com-
mentators have viewed defendants' failure to report child abuse as
establishing a sufficient causal connection between negligent con-
duct and injury.28 Although Vicki's merely reporting the abuse
might not have been sufficient to fulfill her legal duty, some would
argue that failure to report child abuse "naturally leads" to further
abuse and thus satisfies the causal connection. One commentator
labeled failure to report child abuse a "precursor" to continued
abuse.0 9 Courts have also noted a link between failing to report
child abuse and. increased incidents of that abuse.210 At least one
writer has suggested that an abuser might interpret other people's
failure to make any efforts to stop the abuse as implicit approval of
his conduct. 1
The Reynolds approach, however, misses the point. The ques-
tion is not whether the abuse will continue if Vicki fails to report it;
the issue is whether the abuse will stop if Vicki reports it. The abuse
in DeShaney did not stop when Joshua's stepmother reported it to
child welfare officials; it did not stop when neighbors reported it;
and it did not stop even when doctors reported it. Similarly, in the
hypothetical, nothing suggests that Darren's abuse of Jeff will stop if
Vicki reports it. Nothing connects Vicki's failure to report the abuse
and Darren's abuse of Jeff. Under Reynolds, Vicki's failure to report
the abuse did not "naturally lead" to the occurrence of further abuse.
Another test the courts might use to determine causation is the
substantial factor test. This test is often used when two or more
events contribute to a single injury. 12 Courts have used this test in
the criminal context when determining a parent's guilt for failure to
report child abuse. For example, the court in Wisconsin v. Wil-
207. Reynolds, 37 La. Ann. at 698.
208. See Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1976); Collier, supra note 2, at
191.
209. Collier, supra note 2, at 191 ("Failure to act on behalf of the child is a precursor
to further injury. In the absence of intervention, child battering typically escalates and
more serious injuries are inflicted upon the child.") (footnotes omitted).
210. Landeros, 551 P.2d at 395 & n.9.
211. Collier, supra note 2, at 191 ("Furthermore, the perpetrator may believe that
acquiescence by knowledgeable adults is a form of acceptance. Acquiescence may serve to
reinforce the abuser's belief that the child deserves these beatings. The child is thus in
danger of future beatings.") (footnote omitted).
212. See generally Anderson v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45
(Minn. 1920).
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liquette2 18 concluded that the conduct of a mother who failed to take
any action to stop her husband's abuse of their children constituted
a cause in fact of the children's injuries. Although the father's con-
duct was a "direct cause" of the abuse, the mother's conduct was a
"substantial factor which increased the risk of further abuse."214 The
court did not explicitly define substantial factor but reached its con-
clusion based upon the following facts: the mother allegedly knew of
the abuse; she continued to leave the children alone with their father
when she went out; and she did nothing to prevent the abuse." 5
Both sides in a failure to protect case can argue the substantial
factor test in support of their positions. For example, in the hypo-
thetical, Vicki will maintain that even if her failure to intervene did
contribute to the ongoing abuse, this contribution was insignificant
compared to what Darren did, and thus, was not a material or sub-
stantial factor in causing Jeff's injuries."6 Relying on Williquette,
Jeff would counter that although Darren was a direct cause of the
abuse, Vicki's inaction was a substantial factor in the abuse. She
suspected that Darren was abusing Jeff, she continued to leave Jeff
alone with Darren, and she took no measures to protect him. There-
fore, because the hypothetical is factually analogous to Williquette,
Vicki's failure to protect Jeff was a substantial factor in causing
Jeff's injuries.
Aside from establishing cause in fact, a plaintiff must also
prove that a defendant's behavior was a proximate cause"7 of his
injury. Vicki's failure to protect Jeff from abuse was a proximate
cause of his injuries. The California Supreme Court analyzed this
element of a negligence claim when a physician failed to diagnose
battered child syndrome and thus failed to report that diagnosis in
Landeros v. Flood.215 The child had been beaten severely several
times before she was brought to the hospital emergency room. When
she arrived, she had several broken bones, bruises all over her back,
cuts on her body and a skull fracture.2 9 After treating her physically
apparent injuries, the physician released her to her mother's care
without diagnosing her condition or reporting it to child welfare
213. Wisconsin v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986).
214. Id. at 150.
215. The court noted that she could have reported the abuse or removed the children
from her husband's care. Id. at 149-50.
216. See, e.g., id. at 149-52.
217. Judge Andrews defined proximate cause: "What we mean by the word
'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense ofjustice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point." Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
218. 551 P.2d 389, 391 (Cal. 1976). The reporting duty in Landeros arose under Cali-
fornia state statutes. Id. at 392.
219. Id. at 391.
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authorities. Nine weeks later, her condition was diagnosed and
reported by another hospital.220
The defendant-physician who had first examined the child ar-
gued that the continued beatings, inflicted by the child's mother and
her husband after the emergency room visit, operated as a super-
seding cause of the child's injuries and thus relieved him of responsi-
bility. 2 ' The court concluded that although the subsequent abuse
was an intervening act, it did not sever the connection between the
emergency room physician's negligent failure to act and the child's
injuries, and thus was not a superseding cause.222 The defendant
should have foreseen that the abuse of the child would continue.
Similarly, a defendant like Vicki would be unsuccessful in arguing
that Darren's continued beating of Jeff constituted a superseding
cause of Jeffs injuries. Darren's abusive conduct did not break the
connection between Vicki and Jeff; instead, Vicki's failure to take
any steps to stop the abuse made Darren's continued beating of Jeff
foreseeable.
The conclusion that Vicki's failure to protect Jeff acted as a
proximate cause of his injuries is further supported by public
policy.2 3 Legislatures, which have been traditionally viewed as
articulating policy through their law-making capacity, have imposed
criminal penalties on parents who fail to protect their child from
abuse in the home. 24 In recognizing a tort cause of action for similar
conduct, courts would simply be following the lead of the
legislatures. Courts, legislatures, and the rest of society expect
parents to protect their children from harm. Children turn to their
parents for care and protection, and society encourages them to do
so. When parents ignore the abuse of their child, they let not only
their children down but also other children and the rest of society.
Parents must accept responsibility for the consequences of their
inaction; public policy demands that they compensate their child
220. Id.
221. Id. at 395.
222. Id. ("It is well settled in this state... that an intervening act does not amount
to a 'superseding cause' relieving the negligent defendant of liability. ... "). Instead, the
court determined that the trial court had dismissed the plaintiffs claim prematurely. The
plaintiff had a right to present evidence that the physician's failure to diagnose and
report the abuse made the subsequent beatings foreseeable to him. Id. at 395-96.
223. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (N.Y 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) ("Proximate cause... is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules
to govern our judgment. There are simply matters of which we may take account.").
224. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (1987) (stating that a person is guilty
of child abuse if he "willfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child.., to be placed in
such a situation that its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or
its morals likely to be impaired"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-39 (Supp. 1986) (a person is
guilty of child abuse if he "omits the performance of any duty").
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who is injured when they turn away.
4. A Note on Damages. As in any tort action, a finding of habil-
ity with respect to a defendant will be accompanied by an obligation
to pay damages to an injured plaintiff.25 However, in the specialized
context of failure to protect from child abuse, concerns about the
feasibility of collecting damages from parents have been raised.22
One aspect of this issue centers on a supposed connection between
child abuse and one's socioeconomic status. Some studies indicate
that people in households with incomes of $15,000 or less are four
times more likely to abuse their children than those in homes with
incomes above that level.2 Because the parent who fails to prevent
the abuse lives in that household, it is assumed that she has a low
income, no insurance, and is therefore judgment-proof. Other re-
searchers, however, counter that the incidents of child abuse in
households with incomes of above $15,000 may be significantly
underreported in proportion to the reporting of abuse in poor
homes.2 People with greater financial resources may be more aware
of the need to hide child abuse and are in a better position to do
so. 229 The stigma attached to child abuse makes such abuse by
middle-class parents highly newsworthy. 20 The ability of middle-
225. In the case of failure to protect from abuse, a reasonable, prudent parent whose
failure to protect a child from abuse caused the child's injuries must compensate the
child. Once the child has established physical injuries, the parent should pay for the
child's medical expenses, pain and suffering and emotional distress. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 11, § 905. Plaintiffs in these cases may also be able to recover for their diminished
childhood, although some courts may include such recovery under emotional distress.
Although the parent might argue that an infant's pain and suffering is difficult to
ascertain and impossible to prove, most courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g.,
Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 500 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Cal. 1972). The jury members
can draw on their own experiences to determine that abuse produces pain, suffering and
emotional distress. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(Cal. 1952) (concluding that a jury is better able to determine "whether outrageous
conduct results in mental distress than whether that distress in turn results in physical
injury"). Thus, the child should be able to recover damages for mental as well as physical
injuries.
226. Lanham, supra note 157, at 112-16.
227. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND
PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, Contract No. 105-85-1702, Study Findings,
5-30 (1988) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
228. CYNTHIA C. TOWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 60 (1988).
229. Interview with Cristine Kearney, American College of Social Workers (ACSW),
in Geneva, Ill. (June 27, 1993) (notes on file with the author).
230. See, e.g., Jennifer Lenhart & Flynn McRoberts, Abandoned Kids' Parents Land
in Jail, CHI TRIB., Dec. 30, 1992, at 1 (chronicling the case of the couple living in an afflu-
ent Chicago suburb who left their daughters home alone during the Christmas holidays
while they vacationed in Mexico). The case attracted worldwide publicity, in part, because
the parents were middle-class. Id. Don Baldwin & Elizabeth Birge, Schoos Give
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class parents to hide the abuse makes it more difficult for people
outside the home to detect that such abuse is occurring.231 Therefore,
it is imperative that the parent or other responsible adult living in
the home who knows of the abuse intervene to protect the child.
That person may be the only one to witness the abuse or its effects
and the only one who can protect the child. Speculation about that
individual's financial status should neither drive, nor thwart, this
cause of action.
A second aspect of the feasibility of collecting damages revolves
around liability insurance. The assumption that most abusers, and
likewise most people who live with abusers, do not have home-
owners insurance policies again rests on the unproven assumption
that they are poor. However, two recent decisions which have
allowed tort claims to be brought for parents' failure to protect from
abuse tend to undermine this assumption. In Elliott v. Dickerson 32
and Richie v. Richie,"3 the courts allowed daughters to recover from
their mothers for failure to protect them from sexual abuse by their
father and stepfather, respectivelyYm In both cases, the mothers'
homeowners insurance policies provided the means of recovery.235
Courts then should not assume that parents who fail to protect
children from abuse are judgment-proof. Even if most parents
cannot pay, courts should not insulate those defendants who have
insurance or assets like the mothers in Elliott and Richie from
liability.
Regardless of the defendant's solvency, courts should recognize
a tort claim against parents who fail to protect a child from abuse in
the home. Even if no money can be recovered, there is a value to the
child in a public declaration that what happened to him or her was
wrong. Furthermore, the state sends the message that inaction re-
sulting in a child's abuse will not be tolerated. Parents will be on
notice that they are expected to use reasonable care to prevent abuse
in their home or face liability and the stigma associated with child
abuse. Hopefully, this message will encourage those who sit pas-
sively in the face of abuse to stand up and act-for children.
In sum, Vicki should be held liable for failing to take rea-
Daughters Up for Adoption, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1993, at 1 (reporting that the couple
terminated their parental rights and gave up their daughters for adoption).
231. Middle-class families are less likely to be monitored by a governmental agency
because they generally do not receive subsidies, either in the form of state welfare or
federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Interview with Cristine
Kearney, supra note 229.
232. Elliott v. Dickerson, No. 91-1524-B/F (D. Tey. Oct 17, 1992).
233. Richie v. Richie, No. 91-03635 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 1992).
234. See supra note 182.
235. See Gillman, supra note 157, at A45; Nelson, supra note 182, at Al.
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sonable steps to protect her son Jeff from abuse. Modem tort law
does not shield her from liability under a claim of parental
immunity. A strong public policy against child abuse demands that
a duty be imposed on her to protect her son. That duty requires her
to conform her conduct to that of a reasonable, prudent parent and
take reasonable steps to prevent the ongoing abuse of her son.
Because Vicki did not take such steps, she breached her duty of care
to her son. Under the substantial factor test for causation, that
breach of duty operated as a cause in fact of her son's injuries.
Although there were events that occurred between Vicki's failure to
intervene to stop the abuse and Jeff's injuries, notably Darren's
beating of Jeff, those events were not sufficient to break the chain of
causation between Vicki's negligent conduct and Jeff's injuries.
Thus, Vicki was a proximate cause of those injuries. Finally,
concerns about the feasibility of collecting damages from parents
such as Vicki should not preclude these claims.
B. The Case of The Uninvolved Neighbor
The next scenario, which examines the obligations of a neigh-
bor who fails to report child abuse, raises questions about the limits
of liability in such cases. The legal basis for liability in this hypo-
thetical is less clearly imbued in tradition than is the basis for
holding parents liable for failing to protect their children. However,
the same policy considerations that supported imposing a duty of
care on parents underlie the need to extend that duty to others who
know of child abuse but fail to act on that knowledge.116
Paul Harris lived next door to the Frank family in a large
apartment complex. The Franks have three children, aged four, two
and six months. Paul frequently overheard heated, verbal argu-
ments between the parents, Linda and Rob Frank, arguments which
often sounded as though they culminated in physical fights. The
arguments always occurred late in the evening after Rob returned
home; Paul met him coming in a few times and smelled liquor on his
breath. Paul heard furniture being overturned and thrown and the
sound of heavy thuds against the wall. Paul also heard the children
screaming during these fights; usually, their cries escalated as these
fights continued. Paul noticed that Linda, who initially was friendly
and outgoing when the family moved in six months before, had be-
come withdrawn. She rarely ventured outside the apartment, and
when she did, she wore dark glasses and barely acknowledged Paul
if she met him. Paul also saw the two older children playing in the
236. The analysis in this section raises only the new issues presented by this type of
claim and does not review the issues that were covered extensively in the first hypo-
thetical. See supra part IV.A.
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courtyard of the apartment. He saw large bruises on their bodies on
more than one occasion. The issue is whether the Frank children
could maintain a suit against Paul for failing to intervene under
these circumstances.
1. Duty and Breach. Unlike the negligence case against Vicki,
in which her duty was more easily established because of her
parental status, Paul's duty is less easy to determine.237 A court will
focus on the same issues presented in Vicki's duty analysis: what
standard of care Paul should be held to, and under that standard,
whether his failure to act was reasonable under the circumstances.
Paul's failure to intervene should be judged against the conduct
expected of the reasonable, prudent person under the circumstances.
Using the reasonable person approach, courts can take into account
all of the circumstances surrounding Paul's decision not to get in-
volved. Under any interpretation of this standard, Paul's failure to
intervene falls below the minimal level of care expected of an adult
who is aware of ongoing child abuse.
Having established that Paul's conduct must be evaluated in
light of what is expected of a reasonable, prudent person, the issue
becomes whether his conduct fell below that standard of care. Paul's
conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances because he
reasonably should have perceived the risk of harm to the Frank
children. Paul will first argue that it was not reasonable for him to
perceive the risk because the Frank children were not in his range of
apprehension. Paul was not related to them, he had not undertaken
to protect them, and he had no control over their father's conduct.
Thus, the kind of connection between plaintiff and defendant that
gave rise to Vicki's duty to Jeff simply does not exist in this case.
Furthermore, Paul will maintain that he should not be ex-
pected to forge this kind of connection. The decision to assist others
involves a moral choice, and should not be converted into a legal
duty.238 The principle of individual autonomy runs deep through the
American legal system, and spawned the no-duty to rescue rule.235
237. See supra part IVA.3 for a discussion of causation.
238. See Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Mich. 1976) (Fitzgerald, J., dis-
senting). Judge Fitzgerald wrote:
No authority is cited for this proposition [that a legal duty exists] other than the
public policy observation that the interest of society would be benefitted if its
members were required to assist one another. This is not the appropriate case
to establish a standard of conduct requiring one to legally assume the duty of
insuring the safety of another.
Id.
239. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 56, at 373; see also Adler, supra note 15, at
914-17 (criticizing the argument that individual autonomy should preclude replacing the
no-duty rule with an affirmative duty of care).
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The no-duty rule assumes that people take on a burden when they
help someone who is in trouble; the concept underlying the no-duty
rule is that the burden should be taken on voluntarily instead of
being imposed on them.240 Because people should be able to deter-
mine who and when they will help, Paul should not be required to
intervene in a private family matter. Thus, the argument concludes,
the choice should be his, not the legal system's.
When the issue is child abuse, however, this approach is fun-
damentally flawed for several reasons.241 First, as the current ex-
ceptions to the no-duty rule suggest, the principle of individual
autonomy is not absolute.242 The right not to get involved may be
superseded by a pre-existing relationship between plaintiff and
defendant,243 between defendant and a third party,2" and in
situations where the defendant has begun to act.245 In this case,
Paul's right of self-determination must give way to a stronger,
competing consideration: the need to protect children. In addition,
exculpating Paul in this situation in the name of individual
autonomy ignores the seriousness of family violence. Paul should not
be able to claim that he has no duty to intervene because this is a
private family matter and he is a stranger to the family. Families do
not have the right to choose child abuse as they would make other
choices which would be within the scope of "private family matters."
Violence against children is a societal problem and responsibility for
allowing it must not be confined within a family. Because Paul
should have known that his inaction might cause further injury to
the Frank children, they were in his range of apprehension.
240. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 200-01
(1973) (arguing that people should not be forced to behave altruistically).
241. In a recent newspaper column, one writer responded to the argument that child
abuse is a parent's problem, not a neighbor's. When the writer observed a boyfriend
abusing his girlfriend's children, she recognized that she had to intervene regardless of
what the children's mother did. She wrote:
I was witnessing children being attacked, and it could easily have turned
from rage into destruction-possibly even death.
Other neighbors out in their yards witnessed the event. We were stunned
into silence by what had happened.
I felt as they did, reluctant to interfere in another's family domain, yet I
had to do something for those kids.
Dazed, I walked into my house, called a child-abuse hotline and then our
local police....
I must not keep silent. Whenever I see the opportunity, I must find the
courage to speak up for life.
Clarke, supra note 115, § 6, at 8.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 20-37.
243. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 314, 314A.
244. RESTATEMEENT, supra note 11, §§ 315, 320.
245. RESTATEMIENT, supra note 11, § 324.
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Using the Learned Hand test, the burden of adequate precau-
tions on Paul to eliminate the risk was outweighed by the proba-
bility and seriousness of the injuries to the Frank children. The
burden of adequate precautions was low because Paul had
knowledge of the ongoing abuse and was in a position to act on that
knowledge. Paul knew or should have known of the ongoing abuse:
he heard thuds against the wall, saw bruises on the children,
smelled liquor on Mr. Frank's breath, and observed changes in Mrs.
Frank's demeanor. Unlike Vicki, however, he did not live in the
same house where the abuse took place, and thus, did not have the
same access to information that she did to confirm his suspicions.
Because he was not in the position to corroborate what he had
thought to be true, the same burden to act that was imposed on
Vicki cannot be imposed on him.
Paul still has a duty to take reasonable precautions to elimi-
nate the risk, but what would constitute a "reasonable" precaution
by Paul would be different from what would be "reasonable" as ap-
plied to Vicki. 6 Although the duty "var[ies] with the facts of each
case," the defendant must take appropriate steps to eliminate the
risk. 7 The reasonable precautions that Paul would be required to
take would be less than those expected of the therapist in Tarasoff,
the defendant in Lombardo, or Vicki in the earlier hypothetical be-
cause his options are more limited than are theirs. For example,
unlike Vicki, Paul is not in a position to remove the Frank children
from their parents' custody himself or to keep the abuser(s) away
from them. In his case, reasonable care might be limited to reporting
what he had heard and seen to the police or child welfare officials. 2 8
246. The court would be following the directive of the California Supreme Court set
forth in Tarasoff.
Obviously, we do not require that the therapist, in making that determination
[that the patient poses a serious threat of violence], render a perfect perfor-
mance; the therapist need only exercise "that reasonable degree of skill, know-
ledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that profes-
sional specialty] under similar circumstances."
Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (citations omitted).
As the Tarasoff court noted, once a therapist knows or should have known of his
patient's dangerousness, he has "a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foresee-
able victim of that danger." Id.
247. Id.
248. A defendant such as Paul may argue that the reporting requirement may lead
to both the overreporting and the underreporting of child abuse: individuals will either
look for child abuse where it does not exist or run from it when they see it. The require-
ment of acting with reasonable care, however, eliminates both of these concerns. The
overreporting problem is resolved because defendants are not required to seek out child
abuse where they have no evidence that violence exists. In addition, the requirement that
the abuse be ongoing and meet the statutory definition of abuse addresses the isolated
incident of a person who sees a parent spanking a child in a grocery store. The corre-
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Those authorities can investigate Paul's allegations to determine
their accuracy; if he was mistaken, Paul's reporting should be ex-
cused as long as he was acting in good faith. 49 The burden on Paul
to report what he had observed was minimal and did not outweigh
the probability and seriousness of the Frank children's injuries. 50
An analysis of the probability and seriousness of the Frank
children's injuries is similar to the discussion of the likelihood and
gravity of Jeff's injuries in the earlier hypothetical.25' The probabi-
lity of abuse occurring was more than a likelihood; it had happened
in the past and was virtually guaranteed to take place again absent
any intervention. Moreover, the physical injuries from child abuse
range from minor abrasions to death, and the emotional damage can
be deep and longlasting. The burden on Paul of reporting his suspi-
cions does not compare to the likelihood and magnitude of the risk.
Paul's conduct was unreasonable under the reasonable, prudent
person standard of care, and thus, he breached his duty of care to
the plaintiffs.
2. Causation. The same problems associated with establishing
causation which existed in the earlier hypothetical also exist when
Paul is the defendant: the less that is required of the defendant to
eliminate the risk, the more difficult it is to establish that the defen-
dant was a cause in fact of the abuse.252 Paul's burden of adequate
precautions may be low, but it is more difficult to establish that his
failure to report the abuse operated as a cause in fact of the Frank
children's injuries. As demonstrated in the earlier hypothetical, the
causal connection could be satisfied if Paul's failure to report the
abuse was a material or substantial factor in exposing the children
to further abuse. 3
sponding underreporting problem is addressed by the knowledge standard. A defendant
who seeks to avoid getting involved by ignoring abuse will be liable if he knew or should
have known of that abuse. Thus, in the hypothetical, Paul's desire to feign ignorance of
what was going on next door would not allow him to avoid exercising reasonable care to
prevent the abuse.
249. A person in Paul's position should heed Justice Blackmun's advice in DeShaney
and act: "'We will make mistakes if we go forward, but doing nothing can be the worst
mistake. What is required of us is moral ambition.'" DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't
of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting ALAN STONE, LAW,
PsYcHIATRY, AND MORA=ITY 262 (1984)).
250. Indeed, the burden on Paul of reporting such abuse is arguably much less than
the burden of reporting would have been on Vicki in the earlier hypothetical. In Paul's
case, unlike in Vicki's, he need not face difficult facts about his own living situation and
reveal such personal details to the authorities. Instead, he need only report what he has
observed and let the proper authorities investigate further.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 191-216.
253. That factual determination, of course, would depend on the effectiveness of
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Like Vicki, Paul will claim that the abuser's conduct repre-
sented a superseding cause of the injuries and thus severed his
responsibility to the Frank children.2 ' Moreover, he will argue that
Mrs. Frank's failure to act was another intervening event which
further absolves him of liability for the abuse. However, Paul may
have been in a better position to protect the Frank children than
their own mother was. The facts indicate that Mrs. Frank, like her
children, may have been abused by her husband. It is unreasonable
though for Paul to assume that the problem belongs to someone else.
He identified the problem, and he can do something about it. The
question remains, however, whether by reporting the abuse, Paul
will actually protect the Frank children from future abuse or expose
them to greater violence. This question cannot be answered defini-
tively without further examination of the child welfare system.
255 It
is clear, however, that by reporting such abuse Paul and others
similarly situated would have taken a step towards curbing this
abuse in that after the reporting, more people are in a position to
help the children. Paul, and others so situated, should not be al-
lowed to turn away from what they see and know.
CONCLUSION
The current no-duty-to-rescue rule and exceptions do not ade-
quately protect children from abuse. Instead, the defendant's con-
duct should be evaluated under traditional negligence principles. An
adult defendant who knows or should know of ongoing child abuse
has an affirmative duty to use reasonable care to protect children
from that abuse. This duty is based on society's overwhelming need
to identify child abuse early and to intervene to prevent it before the
harm is irreparable. The nature of that duty may vary depending on
a particular defendant's ability to prevent the harm and is tailored
to the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases, the duty
may be simply to warn the appropriate authorities, while the duty
may require more of a defendant in other cases. Once the defen-
dant's duty and breach have been established, it must be deter-
mined whether the defendant is a cause in fact of the child's inju-
ries. This issue presents a challenge for plaintiffs trying to recover
child welfare authorities in preventing abuse once they have been notified of it.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 217-22.
255. For a discussion of the child welfare system, see Jeanine L. English & Michael
R. Tritz, In Support of the Family: Family Preservation as an Alternative to Foster Care, 4
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 183 (1993); David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the
Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 139 (1992); Paul Johnson
& Katharine Cahn, Improving Child Welfare Practices Through Improvements in
Attorney-Social Worker Relationships, 54 U. P1Tr. L. REV. 229 (1992).
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under negligence theory because the less that is required of the
defendant to establish a duty, the more that may be required to
satisfy the element of cause in fact.
Society has targeted child abuse as a serious problem, but we
have not yet figured out how best to confront it. One way would be to
hold responsible those who know or should know of ongoing abuse
within a family, but fail to acknowledge the problem and act on it.
These individuals are in the best position to identify violence in the
home and to intervene to prevent the violence. Children depend on
the adults around them for care and protection, and society expects
adults who know that children are in danger to act on that informa-
tion. When Vicki, Paul and others turn away from child abuse, and
we allow them to do so, we are all included in the shame of their
silence.

